To what extent does the European recast Qualification Directive protect refugee women seeking asylum on the basis of gender-related claims? by Michels, Mia-Maria
To what extent does the European recast Qualification 
Directive protect refugee women seeking asylum on the basis 
of gender-related claims? 
Mia-Maria Michels 
MCHMIAOOI 
Submitted to Faculty of Law in partial fulfilment of requirement for the degree 
Master of Philosophy (Human Rights) 
Supervised by Tal Schreier 
Words: 24.880 
Research dissertation! research paper presented for the approval of Senate in fulfilment 
of part of the requirements for the M.Phil Human Rights in approved courses and a 
minor dissertation! research paper. The other part of the requirement for this 
qualification was the completion of a programme of courses. 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations govemmg the 
submission of M.Phil Human Rights dissertations/ research papers, including those 
relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that 
this dissertation! research paper conforms to those regulations . 



















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 














Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
2. International Framework ................................................................................................ 7 
2.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ........................................................... 8 
2.2 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) ................. 9 
2.2.1 Persecution ....................................................................................................... 12 
2.2.2 The nexus requirement .................................................................................... 16 
2.3 International developments of women’s human rights regarding gender-based 
violence......................................................................................................................... 17 
2.3.1 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women ...................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3.2 State obligation to protect women from violence under CEDAW .................. 20 
2.4 Soft-law that includes gender-related claims under the traditional refugee 
definition ...................................................................................................................... 23 
3. European Framework ................................................................................................... 28 
3.1 The establishment of a Common European Asylum System ................................. 29 
3.2 Aims of the Common European Asylum System................................................... 32 
4. The recast Qualification Directive ............................................................................... 35 
4.1 Acts of Persecution under the recast Qualification Directive ................................ 36 
4.2 Reasons for persecution under the recast Directive ............................................... 40 
4.2.1 Membership of a particular social group ......................................................... 42 
4.2.2 Political opinion ............................................................................................... 47 
4.2.3 Religion ............................................................................................................ 52 





4.4 Internal Protection or Relocation Alternative......................................................... 59 
4.5 Subsidiary protection standards .............................................................................. 62 






In the course of its attempt to create a Common European Asylum System, the European 
Commission adopted fivelegal instruments1, which are binding upon the member states 
and introduce measures of cooperation in burden sharing2, access to and improvement of 
decision-making processes. This development shall harmonize the different European 
asylum policies, implementing a common approach to deal with asylum seekers and 
refugees throughout the whole European Union.  
One of the five instruments was the adoption of the Council Directive on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted3 (hereinafter Qualification Directive) in 2004. It goes to the heart of 
the traditional refugee definition because it sets out the regional framework of who is 
entitled to refugee status. Thus, it has considerable impact on refugee women’s claims 
seeking asylum on the basis of gender-related claims. 
The Qualification Directive intended to achieve the harmonization of the asylum 
determination procedures among European states.The Qualification Directive introduced 
minimum standards for the determination of asylum claims,aiming at equal outcomes in 
decision-making processes, especially on first instance levels. While all member states 
had to change their national legislation to comply with the provisions of this 
Directive,they were allowed to adopt more favorable legislation. However, after a period 
of four years and an assessment of the situation, it became clear that the Qualification 
Directive failed its goal at least partly, since imbalances in asylum determination 
processes still existed. These resulted in immense differences inrecognition rates of 
                                                 
1 Comprising the recast Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU, the Dublin III Regulation 604/2013, the 
Eurodac Regulation 603/2013, the Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU and the recast Asylum 
Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU 
2NGOs rather use the term ‘responsibility-sharing’, which means a fair distribution of the persons seeking 
asylum among the European member states 
3Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of 





same country nationals in European states4, despite the goal of the concept to reach 
uniform standards. Thecause was said to be insufficient guidance coming from the 
Qualification Directive for the decision-making authorities. Consequently, the European 
Commission adopted a recast Qualification Directive5 in 2011. It demanded national 
legislation to be adapted accordingly by the 21st of December 2013.  
The international refugee regime is governed by the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees6 (hereinafter 1951 Convention). Being a party to that Convention is a 
prerequisite for joining the EU. Thus all European states are bound by the obligations 
arising from the 1951 Convention. Consequently, the recast Qualification Directive is 
“based on the full and inclusive application”7 of the 1951 Convention. 
Nonetheless, due to the development of international human rights law, in terms of the 
protection of women’s rights, it is evident that the 1951 Conventionlacks sufficient 
clarification and guidance for asylum claims arising from women’s experiences of 
traditional harmful practices. Those harmful and discriminatory practices comprise for 
example forced marriage, female genital mutilation, domestic violence including rape, 
China’s one child policy and the risk of forced sterilization emerging in this context as 
well as in others, traditional dress codes, dowry burning or honor killings. This list is not 
meant to be exhaustive, since women might be subjected toseveral other norms, 
customs, rules or policies, which they try to escape from and base their asylum claims 
on. Asylum claims that deal with these forms of harm are often referred to as gender-
related asylum claims. 
However, under the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention a specific ground of 
‘gender’ or ‘sex’ is missing. An asylum claim is only valid and state responsibility can 
only be invoked, if it can be established that one has a “well-founded fear of being 
                                                 
4 in 2012 for example, on first instance level in Belgium and Greece, asylum claims of Afghans were 
recognized in 59,1% and 6,8% respectively, available at http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-
work/protection-in-europe/92-qualification-directive.html [accessed 18.03.2014] 
5Recast Directive on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted 2011/95/EU (2011)  
6Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) General Assembly Resolution 429 (V) 1950  





persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”8 
This is the issue women are confronted with: Do their experiences of suppression and 
inferiority, the harmful practices they are subjected to, amount to persecution under the 
definition of the 1951 Convention? And is it possible to establish that their fear of 
persecution is for reasons of one of the grounds enumerated under the Convention?  
Women have been long invisible within the traditional framework of the 1951 
Convention, reflecting the general gender-blindness in international human rights 
law.9Some have criticized the 1951 Convention for excluding women from its ambit. 
They argue that one more ground, namely gender, should be added to the 
definition.10Others have countered that the Convention is absolutely meant to provide 
protection to women as it is based on non-discrimination and equality principles.11 They 
point out that the problem is that decision-makers have too long applied a male lens of 
interpretation in determination processes and all five grounds of the Convention can and 
must be interpreted in a gender-sensitive manner.12 
Those discussions only started with the development of the general women’s human 
rights discourse three decades after the adoption of the core instrument of refugee 
protection, i.e. the 1951 Convention. While asylum was long thought to offer 
international protection to male, political dissidents, persecuted by the state,13 women’s 
rights violations were in the meantime not recognized due to the public-private 
dichotomy. This phenomenon, which is built on societal attitudes describing gender-
roles, resulting in the public sphere being occupied by men, and the private sphere by 
                                                 
8 1951 Convention, supra note 6, Art.1A(2) 
9 MacKinnon as stated in NahlaValji ‘Women and the 1951 Convention: Fifty Years of Seeking Visibility’ 
Refuge Vol.19 No.5 (2001) at 27 
10 Todd Stewart Schenk ‘A Proposal to Improve the Treatment of Women in Aslyum Law: Adding a 
“Gender” Category to the International Definition of “Refugee”’ Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
Vol.2 Iss.1 (1994)  
11 As can be derived from the Preamble of the 1951 Convention, considering the principles of fundamental 
rights and freedoms of all persons without discrimination 
12 Roger Haines ‘Gender-related persecution’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds.) 
Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection 
(2003) at 327 
13NahlaValji, Lee Anne de la Hunt and Helen Moffett ‘Where are the women? Gender discrimination in 
refugee policies and practices’ Agenda 55(2003) at 62 
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women, is reflected in international law.14 Thus, law was long not applicable in the 
private realm due to a “[l]ack of direct state intervention in the name of protection of 
privacy”.15But since the private sphere is the place where most women are subjected to 
discriminatory and harmful practices or attitudes, evolving international legislation 
regarding women’s human rights clearly incorporated state’s responsibilities to prevent 
human rights abuses in that sphere as in the public realm.16 Thus, acts of gender-based 
violence, committed by non-state actors against women in the private sphere, have been 
internationally condemned and challenged. States now have the obligation to effectively 
protect women from the abuse of their rights by private individuals like the husband or 
community members. These developments had shaping effect on refugee law insofar 
that acts of gender-based violence can amount to persecution and can be linked to one of 
the enumerated grounds of the Convention, if state protection is not provided. This is to 
assess on an individual basis. Hence, gender-related claims must be considered in 
asylum determination processes. Due to the difficulties arising for women under the 
1951 Convention, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
adopted guidelines to help states interpret the existing Convention to include women’s 
experiences. Furthermore, some states introduced gender-guidelines, which detail the 
specific circumstances arising from a claim based on the applicant’s gender, in order to 
assist decision-making officials on national level. However, while some states challenge 
the traditional definition of a refugee through a male-centered framework, others seem to 
apply a narrow definition.  
The recast Qualification Directive intends to overcome the above stated obstacles to gain 
equal outcomes, no matter in which member state the application was made. It provides 
clarity and guidance beyond the provisions of the 1951 Convention and also addresses 
difficulties arising from gender-related claims in more detail than the traditional 
definition. The recast Qualification Directive is currently the crucial instrument for the 
14Alice Edwards ‘Age and gender dimensions in international refugee law’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk 
and Frances Nicholson (eds.) Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations 
on International Protection (2003) at 48 
15Hilary Charlesworth ‘The public/private Distinction and the Right to Development in International Law’
12 Australian Year Book of International Law 190 (1988) at 194 
16Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, General Assembly 
Resolution 34/180 (1979) Art.2(e) 
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determination of refugee statuses on a regional level. Therefore, this paper will analyze 
the recast Qualification Directive in terms of its protection standards, theoretical and 
factual, for women seeking asylum due to the risk of gender-based persecution. 
This paper will analyze the recast Qualification Directive in terms of its protection 
standards for women seeking asylum on the basis of gender-related claims. 
The first chapter undertakes a review of the international legal framework, pertaining to 
refugee claims. It will outline the traditional protection standards of refugee definition of 
the 1951 Convention and the challenges arising for females’ claims within that regime. 
Then, some major international human rights instruments will be examined regarding 
women’s right to equality, non-discrimination and to live free from violence. Hereunder, 
the development of states’ obligation to protect women from all forms of violence will 
find particular consideration. Especially in asylum claims where the fear of persecution 
arises from non-state agents, the states’ willingness and ability to protect the applicant is 
crucial for the assessment of the asylum claim, since persons are only eligible to 
international protection if the state is unwilling or unable to offer effective protection. 
The first chapter will further describe the current soft law regime regarding refugee 
women fleeing harmful practices under both, the 1951 Convention and the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
The second chapter provides an overview of the regional framework regarding human 
rights standards, before then turning to the establishment of the Common European 
Asylum System. The lengthy introduction and historical background information are 
important to understand the European concept of refugee protection. In addition, the 
measures taken under this approach have an impact on the application of the recast 
Qualification Directive and consequently also on the outcome of women’s asylum 
claims.  
In the third part of this paper the recast Qualification Directive is discussed in detail. 
Several articles of importance for women refugees and gender-related claims will be 
consecutively examined. Amendments compared to the former Qualification Directive 
are highlighted as well as the (non-)consideration of suggestions to the recast proposal 





either helped to interpret international or regional legislation through a gender-sensitive 
lens or refused to apply such an approach which often results in the denial of refugee 
status.  
Lastly, the conclusion of this paper provides a summary of the improvements under the 
recast Qualification Directive but also the obstacles which still do exist under the current 
instrument, especially if the bigger picture is kept in mind of the interacting measures 














2. International Framework 
In this part, the international framework dealing with the right to asylum or international 
protection and the protection of women’s human rightswill be outlined in four 
subsections.The international framework is the primary basis for refugee women’s 
claims, as it sets out core obligations for states. Thus, the rights laid down hereunder are 
either directly binding for states or incorporated in national legislation. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights17 (hereinafter Universal Declaration)marks 
the starting point for the development of a legal human rights framework. Secondly, the 
paper will turnto the1951 Convention. The world-acclaimed refugee definition will be 
discussed, stressing the difficulties for women to fit their experiences of gender-based 
violence and harmful traditional practiceswithin the scope of the internationally adopted 
system. Then,the framework of international human rights instruments regarding 
women’s rights will be considered. Under traditional human rights instruments, women 
have the same rights as men, particular in terms of equality rights, constituting a 
principle of non-discrimination. Major treaties protecting the rights of women and men 
alike are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights18 (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights19 (ICESCR)as well as 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment20 (UNCAT). Nonetheless, the maintenance and exercise of harmful 
practices upon womendeprives many females of the rightswritten down in these treaties. 
The recognition of violence against women as human rights abuse was long not 
addressed on the international agenda because of the public-private dichotomy. The 
discriminatory and harmful experiences of women are mostly committed by individuals 
within the private home or community, instead of, as often incumbent in asylum 
                                                 
17Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) (1948) 
18International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) 
(1966) 
19International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) (1966) 
20Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 





determination processes, by state actors in the public realm. Only with the adoption of 
CEDAW, the supervising Committee (hereinafter CEDAW Committee) then declared, 
that violence against women is a form of sex-discrimination and impedes with women’s 
right to equality.21 Thus, the right to live free from violence is clearly a prerequisite to 
fulfill women’s human rights. CEDAW therefore imposes strict obligations on states to 
protect women from violence. Since then, the interpretation of the right to international 
protection was reshaped, because states can be held responsible if they are not able or 
willing to protect women effectively from any forms of gender-based violence, 
irrespective of in which sphere or by whom the violence occurs. According to the 
developments made in the recognition of women’s human rights, guidelines have been 
released by institutions on international and regional level, calling for a gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the refugee definition. Thus, the forth part under this chapter addresses 
soft-law. States are not necessarily obliged to follow these guidelines, but they can assist 
them if issues in the interpretation arise. Due to the voluntary adherence of these 
recommendations, practices in their application vary immensely between states, 
depending on their willingness to include women’s experiences into the definition of the 
definition of a refugee.  
2.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration marks the beginning of the development of an international 
legal framework. Although it is not binding, it was adopted as a commitment of shared 
values and cooperation among states to prevent further human rights abuses, as a result 
of the shocking consequences of the Second World War.22 Several rights regarding all 
humans’ dignity and liberty, without distinctions of any kind, are listed therein. People’s 
sex is explicitly mentioned as one of the grounds on which discrimination cannot be 
made.23 Pertinently, Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration states that everyone has 
the right “to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution.”24 However, Article 14(2) 
restricts the right to only political asylum. Thus, persons who are persecuted for non-
                                                 
21 General Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW Committee, 11th Session (1992) Para.1 
22 History of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml [accessed on 21.11.2013] 
23 Universal Declaration, supra note 17, Art.2 





political reasons would not qualify for the right to international protection.25 In essence, 
asylum is often referred to as ‘political asylum’. Although the Universal Declaration is 
not a binding instrument, it still has inviolable character, comprising all rights which 
have then been enshrined in further international and regional treaties with mandatory 
obligations for the fulfillment of those rights upon member states.26 
2.2 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) 
The reason asylum is generally considered to be political, is attributable to the 
origination process of the 1951 Convention. The Convention was limited in its scope of 
application. Its aim was to address the refugee problem that arose from persons who 
were fleeing Europe as a result of the Second World War.27 It was therefore limited in 
time and geography to refugee problems in Europe. In 1967 however, the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees28 was adopted, removing those limitations.29 With the 
removal of the limitations, the Convention became the universal instrument that 
regulates and securesthe rights of refugees.30Hence, it is the leading instrument or 
‘cornerstone’ with regards to international standards to protect asylum seekers and 
refugees.31 
With regard to the internationally accepted and applied definition of persons eligible for 
international protection or refugee status, under Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention a 
refugee is someone who,  
‘owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
                                                 
25 Id. Art.14(2) 
26 The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml [accessed 28.11.2013] 
27Guy S. Goodwin-Gill ‘Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees’ in United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law (2008) at 1, available at 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/prsr/prsr_e.pdf [accessed 28.11.2013] 
28 UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Treaty Series Vol.606 (1967) at 
267 
29 Id. Art.1 
30 R. Haines, supra note 12, at 326 






outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’32 
Article 1 A (2) also extends the meaning to stateless persons who are seeking refuge 
from persecution, but the country of nationality is understood to be the “country of 
former habitual residence” of the asylum seeker.33 
According to that, the Convention omits any reference to ‘gender’ in its definition of a 
refugee on which one would be able to base her claim of asylum. Article 3 of the 
Convention defines the principles on which state parties must not distinguish between 
persons during the qualification process to the entitlement of refugee status. These non-
discrimination grounds comprise “race, religion or country of origin.”34 Again, this 
provision fails to protect from sex-discrimination in the asylum determination process. 
Thus, the Convention does not guarantee equal access for women to asylum.35 Its 
binding standards, enforced on a daily basis within international practices by the 
signatory states, have “long excluded women, procedurally and substantively, from the 
international right to protection from persecution.”36 
Within the drafting process of the 1951 Convention, the issue of gender-inequality was 
mentioned, but dismissed due to concerns that its inclusion in the treaty might interfere 
with domestic legislation in some states.37 While the 1951 Convention must be 
interpreted in light of its non-discriminatory purpose38, women are rendered invisible 
within the Convention’s protection framework as a result of the emphasis given to 
political activities.39 By the time of drafting, the 1951 Convention was clearly meant to 
protect first generations rights. Political and civil rights were considered to outweigh 
social, cultural or economic rights.40 Following the first decades of the application of the 
                                                 
32 1951 Convention, supra note 6, Art.1A(2) 
33 Id. Art.1A(2) 
34 Id. Art.3 
35 Alice Edwards ‘Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law and 
Policy. 1950-201.’ Refugee Survey Quarterly Vol.29 No.2 (2010) at 22 
36 N. Valji, supra note 9, at 26 
37 UNHCR, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951( Articles 2-11, 13-37) (1997) Art.3(4) 
38 According to the preamble of the 1951 Convention, “human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and 
freedoms without discrimination” 
39 A. Edwards, supra note 35, at 26  
40 Heaven Crawley ‘Gender, persecution and the concept of politics within the asylum determination 





Convention, the lens of interpretation by decision-makers was clearly male-centered. It 
assumed that the typical asylum seeker is “a male dissident, tortured or imprisoned by 
the state for traditional political activities.”41 Women were long not seen as political 
activists, and the roles they fulfilled in political resistance movements, when compared 
with their male counterparts, did not fall into male-defined classifications of political 
activism.42 As a result of prescribed roles to ones gender, like they exist in all societies 
around the globe, women often exercise acts like passing secret messages, administering 
first aid, providing active members with food or helping to hide comrades.43Nonetheless, 
women are active inpolitics and therefore, disregarding the level of involvement, can be 
at risk of being persecuted. In addition, they might also fear persecution simply because 
of familial relations with political activists, whose philosophy is then attributed to 
them.44 
Above all, the most common forms of violence and harmful practices women are 
exposed to are perpetrated by family- or community members within theprivate sphere 
as a result of traditional and religious customs and norms or political discriminatory 
measures and policies. These types of harmare only directed at women because of their 
gender/sex, but at the same time often takeon gendered forms.45Such claims give rise to 
gender-related asylum claims. The difficulty of fitting these patterns of persecution into 
the traditional definition of the 1951 Convention arises from the traditional dichotomy 
between the private and public sphere, which unfortunately, has been read into the 
negotiation and interpretation of the 1951 Convention. As outlined above, the public-
private dividehampers states’ willingness and ability to intervene in human rights abuses 
occurring in private realm. The 1951 Convention reinforces the public-private 
dichotomy through its failure to provide equal protection opportunities for women 
arising from gender-related asylum claims. Even though its language may be said to be 
gender-neutral, it has been pointed out that the omission to include specific gender 
                                                 
41 N. Valji et al, supra note 13, at 62 
42 European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), Position on Asylum Seeking and Refugee Women 
(1997) Para.20 
43 Jane Freedman ‘Women’s Right to Asylum: Protecting the Rights of female Asylum Seekers in Europe’ 
Human Rights Review (2008) at 418 
44 ECRE, supra note 42, Para.20 
45 R. Haines, supra note 12, at 326 
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sensitive provisions weakens protection standards for female asylum seekers.46 For 
example, some feminists have criticized the utility of the framework of equal treatment 
for men and women that is implicit in its gender-neutral language. Their point is that it 
does not help women to counterbalance existing patterns of subordination due to the 
power imbalances they face in relation to men.47Consequently, they have argued that 
“equality is not freedom to be treated without regard to sex but freedom from systematic 
subordination because of sex.”48 Thus, women’s groups and scholars have expressed 
their regrets that the traditional interpretation of the 1951 Convention neglects women’s 
experiences, and have called for gender-sensitive manner application of the Convention 
and asylum procedures.49 To understand the difficulties women experience to fit their 
gender-related asylum claims under the traditional scope of the refugee protection 
regime, some key elements in the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention need to be 
further explained. 
2.2.1 Persecution 
Under the 1951 Convention’s refugee definition,the applicant must establish,among 
other things,that the harm she fears amounts to persecution. This provides an obstacle 
for women who are claiming international protection on the basis of being at risk of 
gender-related persecution. The element of “a well-founded fear of being persecuted”50is 
closely linked to states’ positive obligations to protect their citizens from human rights 
abuses. However, despite the existence of national legislation for the protection of 
women’s rights, some states apparently do not bother to strictly enforce these laws. 
Since gender-related asylum claims are normally based on the fear of persecution due to 
non-state actors, the ability and willingness of the claimant’s government to protect her 
are of vital significance of the outcome of the refugee status determination. This section 
will address what constitutes persecution under the 1951 Convention definition and 
46 H. Crawley, supra note 40, at 17 
47Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright ‘Feminist approaches to International Law’ 
85 Am. J. Int'l L. 613 (1991) at 632 
48 Id. at 632 
49 A. Edwards, supra note 35, at 23 





whether women’s experiences of harmful practices fall within the scope of that 
definition. 
Persecution is not definedin the 1951 Convention. The UNHCR Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol51(hereinafter the Handbook)serves as a guide for decision-making or 
judicial personal of the signatory states, on how to interpret the 1951 Convention and 
how to assess asylum applications.52 In terms of the clarification of the term persecution, 
it only refers to Article 33 of the Convention, which prohibits state parties to return an 
asylum seeker back to her home country, if her “life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of [her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”53 in that country. If other actions can amount to persecution must be 
established within the individual assessment of an asylum claim.54Furthermore, the 
Handbook also addresses persecution on cumulative grounds. This paragraph might be 
of considerable interest for refugee women, as it clarifies that some measures one might 
be exposed to, including discriminatory practices,which themselves do not amount to 
persecution, can in their entirety do so.55It can be said that the term was deliberately not 
defined under the original instrument, as the drafters knew they could never comprise all 
possible forms of mistreatment, which would lead to an individual’s entitlement to 
international protection.56 However, the concept of persecution is not meant to protect 
persons from random incidents though, but rather from continuing and systematic 
violations of their human rights.57 To determine the persecutory content of an act on 
which the asylum claim is based, decision-makers are required to integrate general 
human rights standards, as they impact on and complement the refugee qualification 
process.58 Thus, as a result of the linkage between international refugee law and human 
rights law, the concept of refugee protection was further developed to include women’s 
                                                 
51 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol (1992) HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1  
52 Id. Foreword IV 
53 1951 Convention, supra note 6, Art.33(1) 
54 Handbook, supra note 51, Para.52 
55 Id. Para.53 
56 James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1991) at 72 
57 Id. at 72 





experiences according to the recognition of women’s human rights on the international 
arena.59As consequence, forms of gender-specific harm, disproportionately or even 
exclusively affecting women, have been recognized to amount to persecution by some 
decision-makers or courts.60Several activists, academics, practitioners and refugee rights 
organizations, including UNHCR, are supporting this gender-sensitive interpretation of 
persecutionand argued “that, in order to respond to women's experiences, refugee law 
needs to evolve through a process of interpretation, rather than be amended to 
incorporate new gender-specific provisions.”61 
The 1951 Convention protects individuals fleeing violations or the threat of universal 
values, depriving them of their dignity, as recognized under the core human rights 
instruments by the world community.62 But, to have one’s claim recognized, an asylum 
seeker must also establish evidence of the state’s failure to protect her from violations of 
her human rights.63Because where the claimant’s state of origin can provide meaningful 
protection, she can be reasonably expected to seek protection within that state, instead of 
claiming international protection.64And before all others, it is the duty and responsibility 
of the all nation states’ governments to observe and protect their citizens’ rights.65 While 
the civil and political rights of individuals require a state to abstain from interfering with 
them, and are consequently referred to as negative rights, the so-called second 
generation rights, namely social, economic and cultural rights, automatically invoke 
positive obligations insofar as the state must actively intervene to protect them.66 
Because civil and political rights were considered more important, the Handbook links 
persecution to the action of state authorities in the first instance, before then stating that 
                                                 
59 Id. at 47 
60 Deborah E. Anker and Paul T. Lufkin, Gender and the Symbiosis Between Refugee Law and Human 
Rights (2003) available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/gender-and-symbiosis-between-refugee-
law-and-human-rights-law [accessed on 24.03.2014] 
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persecution might also emanate from discriminatory or harmful actions perpetrated by 
non-state agents, if the government of that state tolerates the committed acts or, despite 
the best of its intentions, fails to provide protection for the victim 
effectively.67Accordingly, women fleeing gender-related forms of harm committed by 
private persons must show that their state is unable or unwilling to provide effective 
protection to be able to meet the first crucial element of the refugee definition.68 
Nowadays, states’ interpretations vary immensely when assessing the claimant’s fear of 
persecution regarding the agents of persecution. While some jurisdictions still demand a 
partial accountability of the state to determine the applicant’s fear of persecution, others 
recognize the right to international protection if the state is incapable to do so.69 In 
Horvath vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department70, the Lords of Appeal found 
that “the word ‘persecution’ implies a failure by the state to make protection available 
against the ill-treatment or violence which the person suffers at the hands of [her] 
persecutors.”71 The court went on to argue that the inability of the state to provide 
protective measures for its citizens is “the bridge between persecution by the state and 
persecution by non-state agents which is necessary in the interest of the consistency of 
the whole scheme.”72  Conclusive thereto, the British NGO called Refugee Women’s 
Legal Group, which is actively involved in policy making structures and works towards 
the guarantee of gender perspectives in national refugee legislation, refers to a simple 
definition: at risk of persecution is where a serious harm and a failure of state protection 
exist.73 
Only if it can be established that the acts of gender-based harm inflicted upon a female 
refugee constitute a serious threat to the claimant’s life or freedom and no state 
protection is available to her, the first element of the determination progress, namely that 
                                                 
67 Handbook, supra note 51, Para.65 
68 States’ obligations to protect women from gender-based violence are further discussed in chapter 1.3.2 
of this paper 
69 A. Edwards, supra note 14, at 60 
70Horvath vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2000)  
71 Lord Hope of Craighead, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Case of Horvath vs. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (2000) available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldjudgmt/jd000706/horv-1.htm [accessed 24.03.2014]  
72 Id.  
73 Refugee Women’s Legal Group, Gender Guidelines for the Determination of Asylum Claims in the UK 
(1998) Para.1.17 
16 
she is at risk of persecution upon return to her country of origin, is successfully met. 
Nonetheless, this does not suffice for the entitlement to refugee status. Therefore, the 
risk of persecution must be for one of the grounds enumerated in the 1951 Convention. 
2.2.2 The nexus requirement 
The definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention comprises five reasons for which 
an individual can be persecuted to qualify as a refugee. These grounds are religion, race, 
nationality, political opinion and membership of a particular social group.74 It is a 
requirement to provide that one is at risk of being persecuted for reasons of at least one 
of those grounds. In this respect, it is the duty of the decision-making authorities to 
examine if the applicant’s fear of persecution can be causally linked to one or more 
enumerated grounds of the Convention.75 A female asylum seeker, whose claim is based 
on gender-related forms of harm, is facing the difficulty that she must fit her claim under 
one of these five grounds. This is why some say the refugee definition under the 
traditional instrument shall be transformed to incorporate ‘gender’ as an explicit sixth 
ground of persecution to ensure easier access to the refugee protection regime for female 
claimants.76 Others counter that the merely annexation of an additional ground to the 
definition does not achieve the desired outcome of gendering the present policies. 
Rather, the current system of refugee protection is in need to undergo a thoroughly “re-
evaluation of all aspects of existing policy and practice to measure their gendered 
impact.”77Thus, all five grounds can be interpreted gender-sensitively to include 
women’s experiences. It is about time for decision-makers on all levels, as well as for 
judicial staff, to include women’s experiences and to acknowledge the political extent of 
women’s refusal to adhere to harmful customs and practices.78The addition of a sixth 
ground to the 1951 Convention could even lead to further exclude women from theambit 
74 1951 Convention, supra note 6, Art.1A(2) 
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of refugee protection by denying them their individual experiences and simply imposing 
the gender-category on them.79 
Due to the developments in international human rights law to recognize and include 
women’s rights under its scope, refugee law was transformed to take gender-based 
asylum claims into account. To assist decision-making officials and governments, new 
guidelines were adopted by UNHCR on how to interpret the 1951 Convention to include 
women’s experiences. These recommendations are not binding upon state but have 
persuasive character.The next part of this paper addresses the progresses made on 
international level to protect women’s human rights, resulting in the adoption of 
CEDAW, before then turning to present soft law standards regarding the female asylum 
applicant’s claims based on gendered forms of harm.  
2.3 International developments of women’s human rights regarding gender-based 
violence 
Although women have been entitled to the same rights as men under traditional human 
rights instruments, they have long not benefited from the ‘equal treatment’ standard due 
to their subordination in the so-called private sphere, outside the operation range of 
states. The abuse of their rights committed by private family- or community members 
has long not been seen as human rights violation. Due to developments in international 
human rights law, legislation was adopted to actively protect women’s rights and abolish 
patterns and attitudes responsible for the subordination of and harmful practices upon 
women. CEDAW provides the international standards for women’s protection needs and 
outlines states’ obligations to protect them. These developments had shaping impact on 
refugee law, because the recognition of gender-based violence as a human rights 
violation enabled women to claim international protection needs if state protection was 
denied. The following part briefly addresses the marginalization of women from 
international human rights law, before then discussing howCEDAW challenges the 
suppression of women through the introduction of extended state obligations.  
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International human rights law seeks to give rights to individual persons and groups, 
allowing them to make claims against their home countries on a global level, and 
thereby shifts the focus from the sovereign state towards the protection of all peoples’ 
freedom and autonomy.80 But even international human rights law, although meant to 
benefit all human beings irrespective of their sex, historically ignored and undermined 
women’s experiences.81 Some even say their needs and interests “have been deliberately 
ignored over the centuries as means of keeping [them] subordinate.”82 Theoretically, 
women’s rights are enshrined into international instruments as far back as the birth of 
the first human rights treaties, since equality and non-discrimination clauses constitute 
two main pillars of the fundamentals of human rights.83 The entitlements of the 
Universal Declaration have been further manifested in the ICCPR and the International 
ICESCR. These treaties impose binding obligations upon their signatory countries to 
ensure that all persons, women and men alike, can enjoy the respective rights listed 
thereunder.84 Albeit the theoretical protection mechanism of international human rights 
law for women, reality proved to be more difficult by interacting with social structures, 
which often shape domestic legislation.85 Accordingly, some feminists criticize the 
framework of equal treatment of men and women, underlying the gender-neutral 
language within the traditional human rights treaties. The 1951 Convention also reflects 
this approach and, as discussed above, as a result women struggle to fit into its ambit. 
Consequently, feminist academics proclaim that this approach does not help women to 
counterbalance the existing subordination, due to the power imbalances they face 
regarding to men.86 It is argued that “equality is not freedom to be treated without regard 
to sex but freedom from systematic subordination because of sex.”87In line with that, 
specific guidelines have been published to help women accessing the regime of 
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international protection. But those progresses only happened after the phenomenon of 
gender-based violence was tackled on the international agenda. The outcome was the 
adoption of CEDAW. 
2.3.1 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Despite the implementation of the first international treaty on women’s human rightsin 
1979, a clear provision on state’s duties to protect women from violence is missing 
therefrom.88 Only ten years after the adoption of the so-called ‘Bill of Rights’ for 
women, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 
Committee), supervising the implementation on domestic level of the respective 
instrument, clarified that women must be protected from violence under CEDAW and 
that signatory states are obliged to collect and release data of gender-based violence.89 In 
its General Recommendations No. 19, the CEDAW Committee then linked violence 
against women with the denial of their human rights and equates gender-based violence 
with discrimination because of women’s sex.90 In addition thereto, it was recognized that 
not only violence committed by state actors, but also violent acts by private persons or 
companies are prohibited and must be eliminated.91Only in the outcome-document of the 
1993 World Conference of Human Rights in Vienna, the Vienna Declaration and 
Program of Action, women’s rights were finally considered human rights and their rights 
as inherent to the universality of all human rights.92In the same year, the Declaration on 
the Elimination of Violence against Women93 (DEVAW) was adopted, finally providing 
a definition for the suffering of women. Hereunder, violence against women is defined 
as 
‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, 
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats 
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of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in 
public or private life.’94 
DEVAW further enumerates specific forms of violence women are exposed to. These 
include: 
(a) ‘Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, 
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, 
dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other 
traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence 
related to exploitation; 
(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general 
community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and 
intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in 
women and forced prostitution; 
(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the 
State, wherever it occurs.’95 
But it is clearly stated that violence can go beyond these forms and is not limited 
hereto.96The recognition and naming of these types of harm is important for gender-
related asylum claims as the list allows for the different practices to amount to 
persecution. Furthermore, since the CEDAW Committee declared gender-based violence 
to fall within its mandate, CEDAW provides the best means in terms of state obligations. 
Thus, the treaty is of actual relevance for female refugees seeking asylum on gender-
related claims since it outlines a new era regarding the positive rights of states to protect 
women from violence. The next part will illustrate the responsibilities of states in depth. 
2.3.2 State obligation to protect women from violence under CEDAW 
As outlined above, within asylum determination processes it is crucial, to provide a 
nexus between the act of persecution suffered by the individual and one of the 
enumerated grounds of the 1951 Convention. In addition, and most often relevant for 
female asylum applicants due to the fear of persecution stemming from the threat of 
non-state actors, the refugee determination demands that state protection is not available 
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for the claimant. Under CEDAW, state responsibilities have been extended compared to 
other human rights instruments and tailored on women’s actual needs. 
Core article under CEDAW is Article 2 as it expresses states’ obligation. It regulates 
member states to combat all forms of discrimination within its domestic legislation and 
to provide substantive equality for women.97 Furthermore states are obliged to combat 
discriminative customs and practices “by any person, organization or enterprise,”98which 
lead to unequal treatment of women.99 This provision is of importance for female 
refugees, as it explicitly prohibits discriminative acts perpetrated by non-state actors in 
both, the public and private sphere.100In General Recommendation No 19, gender-based 
violence is named as a form of discrimination which deprives women of their human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.101Even if gender-based violence is not namely 
mentioned in the Convention’s articles, a link can be always drawn between single 
articles of CEDAW and violence against women by construing that the term 
‘discrimination’ includes gender-related forms of violence.102 The Women’s 
Conventionimposes, for the first time in the history of international human rights 
law,obligations on states to abolish all forms of ‘social and cultural patterns’, existent 
policies, regulations and laws and ‘customs and practices’103, which maintain the idea of 
women’s subordination and inferiority.The CEDAW Committee further clarifies that 
traditional attitudes and stereotyped role ascriptions to one’s sex and gender often 
“perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or coercion, such as family violence 
and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision.”104 
While these acts are forms of direct violence, the Committee urges state parties to 
overcome the underlying factors of gender-based violence, which are often cause and 
consequence all in one, like women’s lower levels of education and in political 
                                                 
97 CEDAW, supra note 16, Art.2a) 
98 Id. Art.2e) 
99 Id. Art.2f) 
100 General Recommendation No.28, CEDAW Committee, 47th Session (2010) Para.17 
101 General Recommendation No.19, supra note 90, Para.7, including the right to equal protection before 
the law, and equality in the family 
102 Center for Reproductive Rights, Freedom from Violence is a Human Right. Government Duties to 
Protect Individuals from Violence, Ill Treatment, and Torture(2008) at 3 
103 CEDAW, supra note 16, Art.2(f) and 5(a) 





participation.105Consequently, since the establishment of a positive protection 
framework which emanates from CEDAW, states can be held accountable for acts of 
gender-based violence, also if committed by non-state actors in the private domain, if 
they fail to comply with international obligations and as a result cannot protect women 
from violence.106 The CEDAW Committee states in this regard that state parties to the 
Convention must “act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate 
and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensations.”107 The obligation to 
apply the due diligence standard, can be put in relation to the examination of a state’s 
unwillingness or inability to offer protection from persecution under the 1951 
Convention. But especially in terms of gender-based violence, the concept of state 
protection as emerging from CEDAW contributed to the development of the 
interpretation of the 1951 Convention’s definition. CEDAW’s protection standards 
provide a clearer and better standard forthe examination of the ability and willingness of 
the respective country, thanoriginating from the Convention itself. Due to the precise 
description of states’ responsibilities geared to women’s needs under CEDAW, the 
concept of international protection was able to deduce guidance from it for the 
determination if state protection is available in the asylum seeker’s country of 
origin.Accordingly, refugee women can benefit from CEDAW, since they can draw on 
the legal obligations arising therefrom in the determination of the fear of persecution in 
gender-related claims.  
The development of the international framework for the protection of women’s human 
rights, no matter if violated in the private or public sphere or based on the justification of 
cultural, religious or traditional practices, impacted on enhancement and extension of the 
traditional definition of the 1951 Convention. Due to “the fact that there is no realistic 
prospect of the Convention being expanded”108, UNHCR and other organizations have 
issued guidelines, which cover the recent developments and address women’s 
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experiences, to assist governments to interpret the 1951 Convention definition in a 
gender-sensitive manner.  
2.4 Soft-law that includes gender-related claims under the traditional 
refugeedefinition 
Although soft law does not impose strictly enforceable rules on states, as do the treaties 
discussed above, it is legally significant by assisting with the interpretation of binding 
instruments. UNHCR issues documents which comprise guiding and recommending 
help for persons involved in asylum determination procedures “with the aim of 
contributing to the improvement of the relevant legal protection framework and 
implementation practices.”109 
The first document mentioning the vulnerability of displaced and refugee women to 
different forms of harm, which lead to physical and mental problems, and calling for 
taking account of their special needs is the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies.110This 
paper marks the outcome document at the end of the women’s decade between 1975 and 
1985 and places refugee within the area of special concerns.111Thus, women themselves 
brought the topic on the international agenda, although the Nairobi Forward-looking 
Strategies lack sufficient guidance on how to deal with this problematic.  
Addressing the 1951 Convention and thus, the internationally applied system of refugee 
determination, it was the European Parliament in 1984 to call for a gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the traditional definition. Herein, they recommendedconsidering female 
asylum seekers who have been persecuted on the basis of gender-related claims as being 
eligible for international protection within the ground of a particular social group under 
109 UNHCR, Guidance for authorities for durable solution for refugees. Available at http://www.unhcr-
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the Convention.112 Only a year later, the UNHCR’s Executive Committee (EXCOM) 
held a session particular on women refugees, concluding that  
‘women asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their 
having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be 
considered as a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of 
the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.’113 
Nonetheless, EXCOM respects the sovereignty of states and allows them in the same 
paragraph to adopt this measure voluntarily.114 It then took the UNHCR some more 
years to issue the first guidelines to protect refugee women in 1991. Herein UNHCR 
mandates that states should collect data to identify specific issues of refugee women115 
and train adjudicating personnel in gender-sensitive techniques for interviewing 
procedures116 as well as of the conditions in their respective countries of origin.117 The 
subsequent guidelines on sexual violence from 1995 recite different conclusions of 
EXCOM, stating that the perpetrators of sexual violence might be private persons,118 
recommending that states should adopt gender guidelines which recognize gender-
specific forms of persecution and thus to entitle refugee women who suffered from 
sexual violence within the meaning of the 1951 Convention’s definition of a refugee, if 
committed for one of the enumerated grounds of the Convention and either perpetrated 
by the state or, in the case of non-state actors as persecutors, if the state is unwilling or 
unable to protect the victim.119 Due to their informing rather than obligatory character, 
these two guidelines were not groundbreaking; as they have not been clear on whether, 
when or how gender-related claims entitle female asylum seekers to refugee status. 
Of bigger impact are the following two guidelines of UNHCR, published as a result of 
the Global Consultations on international protection in 2002. The first guidelines aimed 
to guide governments, decision-making and adjudicative authorities on gender-related 
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persecution120, while the second addressed the meaning of ‘Membership of a 
ParticularSocial Group’121. The former guidelines ensure that gender dimensions must 
be considered in asylum determination procedures. It recognizes that although  
‘gender is not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is widely 
accepted that it can influence, or dictate, the type of persecution or harm 
suffered and the reasons for this treatment. The refugee definition, properly 
interpreted, therefore covers gender-related claims.’122 
It then further describes that the persecutory element must be established in each 
individual case,123 even though a causal link for the reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or membership of a particular social group must be given.124 The 
guidelines also outline what acts or circumstances can amount to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted, including specific references on discrimination and one’s sexual 
orientation.125 In addition, when describing the five enumerated grounds of the 
Convention in the context of gender-related persecution, UNHCR acknowledges the 
emphasis given to decide gender-based asylum claims on the ground of ‘membership of 
a particular social group’,126 reflected in the prevalence of jurisprudences.127 
Consequently, other grounds are often overlooked, although claims of female asylum 
seekers may fit under any of the Conventional grounds or might overlap with one 
another, because they are not ‘mutually exclusive’.128 Unfortunately, under the ground 
of political opinion, UNHCR reinforces the general assumption that women’s claims are 
generally not as political as those of men, since they “are less likely than their male 
counterparts to engage in high profile political activity and are more often involved in 
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‘low level’ political activities”129. Accordingly, UNHCR underline and support the 
emphasis on interpreting gender-based asylum claims of women to fit them under the 
particular social group determinant as can be seen from the guidelines. On the one hand, 
this can prove advantageous for women seeking asylum on the basis of gender-related 
claims because, since it means that their claims can be linked to one of the five grounds 
of the 1951 Convention. On the other hand does this interpretation not support the en-
gendering of the other Convention grounds and downplays women’s experiences of 
discriminative or harmful treatment as stemming from religion or politics.130 
However, the guidelines on ‘membership of a particular social group’ serve as 
complement to the Handbook as do the guidelines on gender-related persecution and 
therefore “provide legal interpretive guidance”.131 Herein, the term of a particular social 
group is defined as  
‘a group of persons, who share a common characteristic other than their risk of 
being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic 
will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise 
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.’132 
In line with UNHCR remarks that one’s sex might be a clear characteristic to fit within 
the scope of a particular social group, the case of Khawar before the Australian High 
Court highlighted that women in all societies constitute a “distinct and recognizable 
group; and their distinctive attributes and characteristics exist independently of the 
manner in which they are treated, either by males or by governments.”133Despite that, 
the guidelines also stress that the particular social group is not a catch-all element for 
any persecuted persons and a member of a particular social group must still establish a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted as well as the linkage to one of the five 
enumerated grounds.134Regarding non-state actors of persecution, the guidelines extend 
the nexus requirement as required under the traditional definition. Where originally a 
link had to be established between the act or threat of harm and one of the five grounds, 
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the concept was broadened to include the possibility of a causal linkage if not 
thepersecutory act itself, but the state’s failure to provide protection must stem from one 
of these grounds.135 
Hence, the traditional interpretation of a direct link between the act of persecution ‘for 
reasons of’ at least one of the Conventional grounds is overcome. This is an important 
for refugee women, because in most gender-related asylum claims the threat of 
persecution isstemming from private persons. This meanswomen must rely on the ability 
and willingness of their home countries to offer protective measures. From now on, 
women have the possibility to establish a valid refugee claim by connecting the state’s 
denial of protection to one of the grounds. This acknowledgement of anindirect link 
takes into account their experiences of being persecuted in the private sphere at the hand 
of family- or community members and state’s failure to provide effective protection 
from those forms of gendered harm.136 
  
                                                 
135 Id. Para.23 





3. European Framework 
All European member states137 are bound to comply with several international treaties 
like the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, the 1951 Convention, UNCAT and the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination138. The ratification of the 1951 
Convention is a prerequisite for states, if they wish to become a member state of the 
EU.139 Furthermore, Europe has its own EU law and is in terms of human right standards 
led by the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols140 (ECHR), which 
roughly echoes the protection framework of the Universal Declaration and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights141 (EU Charter) of the EU. 
While the ECHR does not include a right to asylum, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which was only adopted in 2000, incorporates the right to asylum now in its Article 
18142. The Charter also comprises that “[e]veryone is equal before the law”143, 
discrimination on the grounds of one’s sex or sexual orientation is forbidden144, gender-
equality must be ensured and that this allows for the adoption of advantageous measures 
for women.145Under EU law, particularly the Treaty on European Union146, equality 
between men and women must always prevail147 and gender-equality is further to be 
promoted in all activities and policies undertaken by EU member states or institutions.148 
To further reach the goal of gender-equality, a Convention on Preventing and Combating 
                                                 
137 There are 27 at present. Member states transfer power to different EU institutions, like the Council of 
Europe and the European Commission, which can adopt legislation, either directly binding for the member 
states or to be adopted within national laws 
138International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General Assembly 
resolution 2106 (XX) (1965) 
139 Elspeth Guild ‘The Europeanization of Europe’s Asylum Policy’ Int J Refugee Law Vol.18 No.13-14 
(2006) at 630 
140Convention on Human Rights as amended by Protocols Nos.11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols Nos. 
1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 
141Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01 
142 Id. Art.18 states that ‘[t]he right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees 
and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community.’ 
143 Id. Art.20 
144 Id. Art.21 
145 Id. Art.23 
146Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, C 83/13 (2010) 
147 Id. Art.2 
148Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), C 115/47 
(2008) Art.8 
29 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence149 (hereinafter Istanbul Convention) 
was opened for signature in 2011,  
‘recognizing that violence against women is a manifestation of historically 
unequal power relations between women and men, which have led to the 
domination over, and discrimination against, women by men and to the 
prevention of the full advancement of women.’150 
Article 60 of the Istanbul Convention imposes the duty on signatory countries to 
introduce legal measures to ensure gender-based violence against women can amount to 
persecution and that each Convention ground is interpreted in a gender-sensitive 
manner. If a causal link between the act of persecution and one (or more) of the 
enumerated grounds can be established, international protection must be granted.151 
However, due to the lack of ratifications, the Istanbul Convention did not enter into 
force yet.152 
This chapter will provide a thorough review of the European political developments. 
Thereby the paper focuses on the establishment of a Common European Asylum System 
which sets out the standards for refugee protection and determination in the member 
states. This context is helpful to understand the legal framework of the former 
Qualification Directive from 2004 and particular the recast Qualification Directive of 
2011, which will be then analyzed in detail regarding its protection standards for women 
seeking asylum on the basis of gender-related claims in the next chapter.  
3.1 The establishment of a Common European Asylum System 
Based on the clearly economic aim of the EU to create a free market among the EU 
member states and to “offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice”153, in 
the course of the Schengen Agreementthe internal borders between the states 
149Council of Europe, Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence (2011) 
150 Id. Preamble 
151 Id. Art.60 
152 Council of Europe, Treaty Office, available at: 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=210&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG 
[accessed 27.01.2014] 





wereabolishedfrom 1985 on.154 This in turn led to extensive security controls at the 
external borders to keep tabs on the immigration of third-country nationals.155At that 
time, asylum and immigration policies have been dealt with on intergovernmental level 
within the so-called ‘third pillar’ of the EU, under which no participation of European 
institutions was ensured.156 As a result, countries have created their own asylum policies 
on a national level. Some practices have been imitated by neighboring countries with 
spreading effect and therefore had a bottom-up impact on the creation of common 
policies throughout the EU.157 
However, due to the abolishment of the internal borders, asylum seekers were able to 
travel freely among the member states once they crossed the external borders of the EU. 
Thus, they were also able to lodge asylum applications in multiple jurisdictions, a 
phenomenon often referred to as ‘asylum shopping’158.As a result, the current attitude 
towards asylum seekers is one of disbelief because they are often expected to abuse the 
system.159 Due to that,asylum seekers are seen to constitute a national threat and 
politics were adopted to “prevent asylum seekers from entering the internal market.”160 
Consequently, it has been stated that the European policies are rather governed by 
politics, than the principle of international law.161 
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The Schengen Convention162 was superseded by the Convention determining the State 
responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States 
of the European Community163 (hereinafter Dublin Convention), which was further 
amended into the Dublin Regulation III164. All of those instruments were intended to 
respond, at the respective time of their implementation, to the internal market situation 
of free movement, which was seen problematically only for third-country nationals. 
They thus determine that the first country of arrival within the European member states 
is responsible for the examination of the asylum claim.165Furthermore they state that 
only one asylum application can be made within the European countries.166 An applicant 
can be rejected by the state where the claim was lodged, if the asylum seeker entered the 
EU via another member state. The asylum seeker is then transferred the firststate of 
entry of the EU, to have her application examined there.167 Although meant to be one of 
the first measures to harmonize the different asylum policies among the European 
nations into an efficient, fair and rapid system,168 it was criticized to be a system of 
burden-allocation rather than burden-sharing.169 For instance, UNHCR and ECRE 
expressed their concern for shifting a disproportionate burden to the countries at the 
external edge of Europe, particularly to southern and eastern countries, resulting in a 
negative impact on the assessment of asylum seekers’ claims in terms of having their 
case promptly and meaningful examined.170This resulted in the recognition of the need 
of legal instruments, which harmonize the different national refugee status 
determination processes and procedures, as well as reception standards to reach a 
uniform standard of refugee protection. 
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3.2 Aims of the Common European Asylum System 
In 1999, European Heads of States met in Finland to discuss the framework of the legal 
and political developments of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which 
resulted in the Tampere Presidency Conclusions171. It was confirmed that all member 
states maintain “absolute respect of the right to seek asylum”172 in terms of the 1951 
Convention. Furthermore, a specific remark was made to pay particular respect to 
women’s human rights in Europe’s internal and external migration policies.173 During 
this meeting, the foundation for the CEAS was negotiated.However, to address asylum 
policies on the European level, another development was necessary. Thus, with the entry 
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty174 in the same year, asylum and immigration matters 
were moved from the third pillar, where the member states had decision-making power 
over their own national asylum policies, to the first pillar of the EU. Since the policies 
under the first pillar are governed by the European Community, state’s sovereignty 
regarding asylum was removed. Instead,responsibility was transferredto the 
supranational level, shifting power to EU institutions to adopt binding legislation with a 
top-down impact on the member states.175 With the aim of making progress to 
harmonize the different national asylum systems into a common approach, Article 63 of 
the Amsterdam Treaty states that the European Council must take measures within a five 
year period regarding binding minimum standards for the member states in the area of 
asylum. These measures must be in compliance with the 1951 Convention.176 The four 
fields in which measures must be adopted are  
(a) ‘criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is
responsible for considering an application for asylum submitted by a
national of a third country in one of the Member States,
(b) minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers in Member States,
171 European Council, Tampere Presidency Conclusions (1999)  
172 Id. Para.13 
173 Id. Para.11 
174Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, C 325/33 (2002) 
175 Anne von Oswald, Europeanization in the field of Immigration and Asylum (2011), available at  
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(c) minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third
countries as refugees,
(d) minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting or
withdrawing refugee status.’177
At the end of that five year period a framework for the establishment of the CEAS was 
set out and a common ground in terms of cooperation among the member states was 
reached. Nonetheless, the European Commission conceded that „the objectives set at 
Tampere have not yet all been achieved.“178Hence it was time to further build on the 
results of the Tampere era. Therefore, another five-year program was adopted. The 
Hague Program was running from 2004-2009 and often referred to as the first phase of 
the CEAS. Hereunder, legally binding instruments were established on a supranational 
level, requiring the member states’ compliance.179 
In compliance with the statutory provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the objectives 
determined at Tampere, in 2004 the first Qualification Directivewas implemented. At its 
core, the Qualification Directive intended to achieve common protection standards 
among the member countries180 and to reduce secondary movement of asylum seekers 
“purely caused by the differences in legal frameworks.”181 On a long term basis, the 
Directive seeks to implement a uniform status of international protection valid among all 
EU member states,182 since considerable differences in the recognition and rejection 
rates of asylum seekers from the same countries of originin different European 
jurisdictions were found.183 As Dr. Lambert notes, the Qualification Directive is, “from 
the perspective of international law, (…) the most important instrument in the new legal 
order in European asylum because it goes to the heart of the 1951 Convention”.184 
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Again, after the five year period, the European Commission recognized that the intended 
harmonization of asylum policies and legal practices among the member states was not 
yet achieved. Indeed, although providing the basis for future developments, 
“shortcomings have been identified andit is clear that the agreed common minimum 
standards have not created the desired level playing field.”185 Thus, the time schedule for 
the establishment of a CEAS was once again postponed to be completed by 2012. 
Remarks were made bythe Commission of the European Communities, to include 
‘gender considerations’ into a coherent and comprehensive common standard in the new 
phase of the CEAS,186to ensure gender equality.187 
The second phase of the CEAS was implemented by the Stockholm Program 2010-2014 
and replaced its predecessors, the Tampere Conclusions and Hague 
Program.188Hereunder, the recast Qualification Directive was adopted in December 
2011, requiring national legislation to be accordingly transposedby December 2013.189 It 
aims to overcome the remaining differences between the member states and intends to 
provide a clearer and better standard of protection.190 The next part of this paper will 
analyze the recast Qualification Directive in terms of its provisions of particular 
relevance for female asylum seekers and claims based on gender-related persecution. 
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4. The recast Qualification Directive 
The recast Qualification Directive is another move forward in the course of the 
harmonization of the different European asylum policies, the introduction of minimum 
standards among the member states and the aim of reaching common eligibility criteria 
for the determination of refugee status. It serves as a tool for governments, decision-
making authorities and courts to the extent that it provides regional obligation 
provisions, the member states’ national legislature must comply with.191 
However, if member states wish to offer higher protection standards than those laid 
down in the recast Qualification Directive, they can do so.192 Nonetheless, a common 
asylum policy must be in compliance with the “full and inclusive application”193 of the 
1951 Convention and with other international treaties according to Article 78 of the 
TFEU.194 Furthermore, European member states are bound to comply with obligatory 
provisions under other treaties they are a party to.195 Thus, it can be said that the recast 
Qualification Directive should be interpreted in light of other international and regional 
instruments like the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, the ECHR and the EU Charter. But also 
the emerging jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has guiding character for the member 
states.196 
The contributions of several NGOs in the process of proposing amendments for the 
recast Qualification Directive to offer better protection standards for female refugees 
seeking asylum on the basis of gender-based claims resulted in some changes in the new 
Directive which will be discussed in detail in the next part. Therefore, single provisions 
of the recast Qualification Directive which are of importance for those women will be 
consecutively analyzed. 
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4.1 Acts of Persecution under the recast Qualification Directive 
A significant difficulty women face in order to fit their gender-related claim within the 
refugee definition of the 1951 Convention is, whether or not the harm they experience 
amounts to persecution. This is even more an obstacle, as persecution is not defined 
under the core instrument on refugee protection.  
The recast Qualification Directive addresses acts of persecution under its Article 9 and 
provides a definition of the term. Accordingly,an act clearly amounts to a human rights 
violation and can therefore lead to persecution within the meaning of the 1951 
Convention’s definition, if it endangers ones fundamental rights.197 These are one’s right 
to life, the prohibition of torture, forced labor or slavery and the unlawful punishment. 
Those rights are of paramount importance under the ECHR, from which no derogation 
can be made, even in times of war or public emergency.198 The recast Directive also 
recognizes that persecutory acts may take different forms comprising both, bodily or 
mental harm, involving sexual violence199 and that acts can further be of gender-specific 
nature.200 These provisions already existed in the former Directive, but have only been 
adopted by some member states of the EU into national legislation.201 Since acts of 
gender-specific nature are not defined, Article 9(2)f can be criticized for not providing 
sufficient guidance for member states to consider gender-based asylum claims 
adequately.202 Again, the issue of the public-private divide arisesas some states keep 
classifying forms of gender-based violence as private. By doing so, those gendered 
forms of violence are downplayed and women are often expected to seek protection 
from authorities in their home countries. Furthermore, the fact-finding assessment might 
be more difficult if the persecutor is an individual.203Despite this, the former 
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Qualification Directive already incorporated non-state actors as possible actors of 
persecution.204 
Consistent with that provision, the German Federal Administrative Court found that a 
non-state agent must not have any special characteristics and that a single person can be 
entirely sufficient to qualify as persecutor. Despite this judgment however, lower courts 
interpretedin gender-related claims that an individual cannot be the sole persecutor, “but 
insisted that a certain degree of group organization was required to qualify as an actor of 
persecution.”205This example clearly shows the lack of willingness of authorities to 
apply a gender-sensitive refugee definition interpretation and the obstacle refugee 
women are confronted withif establishing a well-founded fear of persecution due to 
gender-related forms of harm perpetrated by non-state agents. 
Nonetheless, UNHCR commented on the former Qualification Directive as setting the 
stage for a more coherent framework of asylum policies among the member states. This 
commentary states that achievements have been made in harmonizing the legal 
interpretation of serious harm and the non-state agent question in the EU member 
states.206 These developments might be further supported by the new amendment in the 
recast Qualification Directive as outlined below, if governments and authorities move 
beyond the male-centered lens of interpretation and start applying a gender-sensitive 
refugee definition, which includes women’s experiences. Therefore, the acts of harm 
suffered by women just for the reason that they are women cannot be longer interpreted 
as personal or domestic conflicts, but should be able to amount to persecution if state 
protection is absent. In order to provide more guidance to the member states and offer 
higher protection standards, especially to victims of persecution perpetrated at the hands 
of non-state actors, the recast Qualification Directive extended the concept of the causal 
link, which requires that the act of persecution is ‘for reasons of’ one of the grounds 
enumerated in the 1951 Convention. 
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Since refugee law is not meant to protect all persons from any kind of persecution, a 
crucial limitation was adopted to identify the persons in real need of international 
protection. Therefore, an asylum seeker must be able to connect the feared persecution 
to one of the five grounds of the refugee Convention. The risk of “a well-founded fear 
for being persecuted [must be]for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion 
or membership of a particular social group”207 to establish a valid claim to international 
protection.208 The Michigan Guidelines specify that it is not the applicant herself who 
must establish the nexus requirement, but it is rather the responsibility of the examining 
authorities to decide whether or not the fear of persecution is for one of the five 
grounds.209 
Traditionally, mostly male asylum applicants were able to establish a direct linkage 
between the persecutory act committed by agents or entities of the state to at least one 
ground found in the 1951 Convention. This direct nexus represented an obstacle for 
women claimants, as they are more likely to be persecuted at the hands of private 
persons and thus there exists a more indirect link between the persecution and the 
inability or unwillingness of a state to provide effective protection.210 Hathaway 
provides four ‘Rajudeen’ principles, which describe different situations where the state 
should be seen as failing to provide protection to the individual. A state’s failure to 
provide protection is established, if either the act was committed by the state in question, 
or if the concerned state condones the persecutory act or tolerates it. Further, even if the 
state neither condones nor tolerates the persecution, but if the persecution still exists 
because the state refuses to provide protection or is for other reasons unable to provide 
protection then a lack of state protection is also established.211 
This so-called protection view was then eventually applied in cases. In New Zealand, 
dealing with a case of domestic violence of an Iranian woman, the judges found 
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‘That if a refugee claimant is at real risk of serious harm at the hands of a non-
state actor (e.g. husband, partner or other non-state agent) for reasons unrelated 
to any of the Convention grounds, but the failure of state protection is for reason 
of a Convention ground, the nexus requirement is satisfied. Conversely, if the 
risk of harm by the non-state agent is Convention related, but the failure of state 
protection is not, the nexus requirement is still satisfied.’212 
Similarly, in Islam and Shah213, a conjoined appeal decision in the UK, the judges also 
addressed two claims of Pakistani women regarding gender-based persecution. The two 
claimants feared domestic violence without state protection and criminal proceedings for 
being wrongfully accused of adultery, which might result in penalties as severe as 
flogging or even stoning to death if returned. The House of Lords dealt with the analysis 
of the term persecution, the nexus requirement and the particular social group definition. 
Regarding the definition of persecution, Lord Hoffman pointed to the definition dating 
as far back as 1988, established by the UK NGO Refugee Women’s Legal Group, who 
concisely stated that persecution amounts to serious harm and the failure of state 
protection.214 When Lord Hoffman considered the reasons for the women’s fear, he finds 
that two elements are present.  
‘First, there is the threat of violence to Mrs Islam by her husband and his 
political friends and to Mrs Shah by her husband. This is a personal affair, 
directed against them as individuals. Secondly, there is the inability or 
unwillingness of the State to do anything to protect them. There is nothing 
personal about this. The evidence was that the State would not assist them 
because they were women. It denied them a protection against violence which it 
would have given to men. These two elements have to be combined to constitute 
persecution within the meaning of the Convention.’215 
Thus, the judges established the nexus due to the state tolerating the physical harm 
against the women and stressed that the state’s inaction is as important for the harm 
feared as the threats of violence by their husbands.  
Following this practice of law, the recast Qualification Directive now recognizes that the 
nexus requirement is also established if not the act of persecution, but the failure of the 
state to provide protection, is for reasons of race, nationality, religion, political opinion 
212Refugee Appeal No.71427/99 (2000) Para.112 
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or membership of a particular social group.216 In its Annex to the recast Qualification 
Directive proposal, the European Commission explains that this step was necessary to 
recognize the criminal extent of acts committed by non-state agents, which are not 
always for reasons of the Convention grounds. Butthe fact that those acts are treated 
with impunity by the state and authorities for grounds mentioned in the 1951 Convention 
definition equally entitles to international protection.217 
Thus, although the recast Qualification Directive attempts to provide a gender-inclusive 
definition of persecution, it is still weak in its guidance since acts of gender-specific 
nature are not further described. Leeway is given to authorities on how to interpret that 
term. And while some countries might adopt clearer national gender-guidelines, others 
might apply a restrict interpretation. However, it is a major progress that the nexus 
requirement can be now also linked to the absence of efficient state protection. This can 
considerably impact women’s claims to asylum due to the likelihood of being at risk of 
persecution by individuals and not state officials.Nonetheless, since either the 
persecutory act or the inaction of the state must be connected to one of the grounds of 
the 1951 Convention, those reasons for persecution will be dealt with in the next 
subsection in more detail, as women must fit their claims to one of those enumerated 
grounds.  
4.2 Reasons for persecution under the recast Directive 
Under the recast Qualification Directive the five grounds are dealt with in Article 10. 
States are obliged to take those reasons for persecution into account when determining 
the asylum claim. Unfortunately the ground of particular social group is the only one 
under the recast Directive, where amendments to incorporate gender-aspects were made.  
From the beginning of the debate around gender-related asylum claims, they were 
suggested to be considered under the category of particular social group.218 Some say, 
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that this ground was adopted to stay flexible and open for future groups at risk of 
persecution.219 The interpretation of women’s experiences under the ground of particular 
social group is also favored by the European Parliament and the UNHCR as they 
advocate the interpretation of gender-related claims under the particular social group 
calculus to ensure those claims are covered under the 1951 Convention, since a specific 
ground of gender is missing in the 1951 Convention definition.220 Also Hathaway states 
that “[g]ender-based groups are clear examples of social subsets defined by an innate 
and immutable characteristic.”221 However, some feminists have questioned and 
criticized the concept of trying to fit the claims of refugee women exclusively within the 
framework of a particular social group. They say women cannot be made to be a 
cohesive group as their experiences vary immensely even within the same state or origin 
due to several differences regarding their status, culture and age. Thus, “the very 
assumption that women have common experiences which can be explained by reference 
to their gender alone can itself undermine the argument”.222 
Haines suggests interpreting all five grounds of the 1951 Convention in a gender-
sensitive manner.223 Especially the reasons of ‘religion’ and ‘political opinion’ should be 
considered if assessing gender-related claims to overcome the public-private dichotomy. 
Women can bepersecuted because they transgress religious dress codes or social mores. 
Hence, they are suspected to hold certain beliefs and are persecuted therefore. Similarly, 
women might be at risk of persecution due to an imputed political opinion. This means, 
they are assumed to hold such an opinion, no matter if they actually do.224Consequently, 
by solely labeling them as a member of a particular social group and considering their 
claims exclusively under that ground, the real source of threat is overlooked. Therefore, 
if women do not conform to discriminating customs, laws or practices, those claims 
should at least find consideration under the grounds of religion or political opinion.225 
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The following section considers the three grounds of particular social group, political 
opinion and religion, as they are most suitable for women to base their claim on. The 
reason of particular social group will be dealt with first and discussed at large, because it 
is the most common one. 
4.2.1Membership of a particular social group 
Under the recast Qualification Directive important amendments were made under the 
particular social group calculus, which aim to improve the assessment of gender-related 
claims to include women’s experiences. UNHCR and ECRE comment on the new 
provision that gender-related aspects of the applicant, comprising his or her gender 
identity, must find due consideration in the assessment of an asylum application.226 This 
is crucial for the advancement of the recognition of female applicants subjected to 
gender-based violence. The more so, because the previous Directive declared that 
gender-related aspects alone could not create applicability of constituting a particular 
social group. But that wording was deleted.227Under the recast Directive decision-
making authorities or judges in all the EU member states are obliged to consider the 
applicant’s gender if examining the reasons for persecution in an asylum claim.  
Despite these improvements, the recast Directive’s definition of who falls under the 
particular social group calculus requires additional consideration. 
In Article 10 it says 
(d) ‘a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in 
particular: 
‐ members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common 
background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is 
so fundamental to identity or conscience  that a person should not be forced 
to renounce it, and 
‐ that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is 
perceived as being different by the surrounding society.’228 
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Although this definition is partly in line with international guidelines, a subtle difference 
to international interpretations is crucial for the protection of asylum seekers.  
Firstly, there are various legal approaches to interpret the term of a ‘particular social 
group’ because the ground lacks clarity.229Although a complete list of people falling 
under this Convention ground cannot be established, the ground also cannot be 
understood to encompass all those people, who do not fit under any other ground of the 
1951 Convention.230 In addition, it is not applicable if the persecution is the only 
characteristic its members share.231 Secondly, over the years international jurisprudence 
developed two different approaches in determining what a particular social group is.   
One approach is commonly referred to as ‘protected characteristic’ or ‘immutability’ 
approach. This approach is also part of the particular social group definition in the recast 
Qualification Directive. It highlights that members of the group must share a 
characteristic element, which is immutable in nature. That means, either out of control 
for the individual to change232 or so vital to one’s identity, core beliefs or values that the 
renunciation therefrom cannot be required due to its human rights substance.233 This 
interpretation emerged in accordance to the interpretation of the grounds of religion, 
nationality, race and political opinion. Those four grounds also hold an either innate 
element, which simply cannot be changed, or such a fundamental element, which cannot 
be demanded to renounce.234 Consequently, in Acosta the Court found that one’s sex can 
fall under the ambit of immutable characteristic, as well as kinship relations or past 
experiences.235Due to the seminal nature of the judgment, it influenced many other 
courts in their decisions and was emphasized by scholars. In the US for example, gender 
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was found to constitute a particular social group.236 In the guidelines commenting on this 
ground, UNHCR also clarifies that women can constitute a particular social group, 
despite the size of the group. This is in accordance with the interpretation of thefour 
other enumerated grounds, as they are also not defined in terms of their size. 
Furthermore, it is not necessary for the claimant to prove that all members of the social 
group are subjected to persecution.237 
In the past some European states refused to recognize women per se as a particular 
social group due “to the risk of receiving asylum claims from ‘half of humanity.’”238 
Therefore some states introduced working instructions for immigration officers, 
explicitly excluding sex or gender to be a sufficient reason for the determination of a 
particular social group.239 Currently, through emerging jurisprudence and the 
amendments in the recast Qualification Directive, a new standard is set out in this 
respect. 
Compared to the ‘protected characteristic’ approach, the ‘social perception’ approach 
instead requires decision-makers to recognize the group through sharedor common 
features, which set the group apart from society at large.240Those characteristics must 
not necessarily be immutable or crucial to one’s identity, but are rather just perceived to 
exist by society. Hence, the characteristics are imposed on the individual, no matter if 
she actually possesses the assumed characteristic or not.241 
UNHCR suggests reconciling the two established approaches into one definition. Thus, 
for the determination of a particular social group, “a group of persons must share a 
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common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as 
a group by society.”242 
The substantial difference between UNHCR’s definition and the one of the recast 
Qualification Directive arises from the applicability of those two standards. While the 
UNHCR guidelines state that the fulfillment of either the ‘protected characteristic’ or the 
‘social perception’ approach is sufficient to determine a particular social group, the 
recast Directive requires both to be applicable. Thus, the EU’s protection standard is 
criticized as too restrictive.243Aleinikoff remarks that most people falling under the first 
approach are also perceived by society as a distinct group. And while the ‘protected 
characteristic’ standard allows a decision-maker to reasonably examine whether or not 
an asylum applicant carries an immutable or innate characteristic, the ‘social perception’ 
approach goes beyond the assessment of internal factors, but demands the applicability 
of external factors.244 Consequently, not all groups who are perceived as such by the 
society they live in, do so because of a fundamental or immutable feature. For example, 
women who refuse to obey traditional or religious dress codes are likely perceived as a 
distinct group since they are clearly cognizable from those women who adhere to those 
customs. Nonetheless it might be difficult to determine if those women would fall under 
the scope of the ‘protected characteristic’ approach.245 
To summarize, the recast Directive strengthens women’s claims based on gender-related 
persecution under the social group calculus, as it provides member states with an 
extended definition, which obliges them to consider questions of gender-aspects. It 
remains to be seen how decision-makers and courts will interpret Article 10(d) of the 
recast Qualification Directive and if they adopt more favorable standards, following a 
positive example of jurisprudence comes from the UK. In Fornah v Secretary of State 
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for the Home Department246, the House of Lords endorsed the reconciliation of both 
approaches in accordance with international guidelines. Lord Bingham criticized the 
cumulative definition of the Qualification Directive. He stated that the requirement to 
fulfill both elements, the innate characteristic and the distinct identity, in order to be 
recognized as a social group, is more limited than requested by international 
authority.247Lord Brown, in the same case,drew on the UNHCR definition and 
emphasizedthat the Qualification Directive has “to be interpreted consistently with this 
definition”.248A third judge,Lord Hope, referred to an Australian case where the 
requirement of a social group to be perceived by society as such is “[t]o require evidence 
of a recognition or perception by the society that the collection of individuals in that 
society comprises "a particular social group" is to impose a condition that the 
Convention does not require.”249 Thus, Lord Hopeprovided that “it is a mistake to insist 
that such recognition is always necessary.”250 As result of the consensus of the majority 
of the judges, this decision has binding character for other courts in the UK and provides 
a more favorable standard than the Qualification Directive due to the acceptance to 
apply the two approaches alternatively.  
In both decisions, Fornah and Islam and Shah, the judges found one’s gender or sex 
sufficient to determine a social group. In the former case the group of ‘women in Sierra 
Leone’251 was recognized and in the latter case it was found that ‘Pakistani women’252 
constitute a social group. Thereby the law was interpreted in conformance with UNHCR 
standards that women share innate characteristics and are often treated in a different 
manner than men.253 
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The recast Qualification Directive does not provide any provisions in terms of a gender-
sensitive interpretation of the political opinion calculus, although women’s rights groups 
urged the European Commission to amend the recast Directive to include a stipulation 
that all five grounds are to be read in a gender-specific manner.254 However, 
international guidelines, academics and jurisprudence have proved more flexible and en-
gendered the other Conventional grounds. As mentioned above, women might face acts 
of gender-based violence on account of an imputed political opinion.  
It is important to note that the 1951 Convention incorporated the term of ‘political 
opinion’ and not ‘political activity’. This means an asylum seeker must not show that 
she has acted upon her political beliefs before she left her country of origin.255Neither is 
it necessary that the applicant actually holds the political opinion, if that opinion is 
attributed to her by her persecutor.256 
A common standard of interpreting asylum claims on the basis of the individual’s 
political opinion is that the claimant is known or alleged to hold “opinions contrary to or 
critical of the policies of the government or ruling part.”257 Although a broader 
definition was suggested by Goodwin-Gill to include “any opinion on any matter in 
which the machinery of State, government, and policy may be engaged”258, the explicit 
recognition of non-state actors as persecutors is still missing. Thus, many refugee 
women with gender-related claims struggle to establish a causal link of their fear of 
persecution for reasons of their political opinion.  
The UNHCR gender-guidelines extend the protection standard for women under the 
ground of political opinion. In Paragraph 32 they state that the rejection of gender roles 
can be interpreted to constitute a political opinion, as well that causation can be 
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established if the actual or attributed opinions contradict those of authorities or society, 
thereby including private persons as possible persecutors. Furthermore is it not a 
prerequisite for the asylum claimant to have suffered persecution or openly expressed 
her opinion in her country of origin in order to establish a valid claim. A forward-
looking assessment will determine, whether her factual or attributed opinion could lead 
to severe consequences and thus, if she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if 
she was returned.259While the gender-guidelines also reflect the general depiction of 
gendered roles, placing women in the engagement of ‘low level’ political activities, they 
acknowledge the imputation of political opinions through activities of kinships. 
However, instead of explicitly stating to consider these claims of imputed political 
opinion under the appertaining ground, the guidelines mention the possibility of 
considering those cases under the particular social group calculus, namely of ‘family’.260 
A study among nine European member states in 2012 found that most countries fail to 
provide a gendered understanding of the political opinion ground. In Sweden national 
gender guidelines exist to help decision-makers determining gender-based claims, but 
these guidelines do not provide a gender-sensitive definition of political opinion. 
Consequently, first instance decisions often fail to apply a gender-sensitive interpretation 
under the other four Conventional grounds besides the PSG.261 An application of a 
woman from Ethiopia, claiming to fear persecution due to her support of the opposition 
party and her father’s activities in the previous governmental system was denied, 
although she was raped by military men during a raid in her family’s home. The judges 
rejected her claim as they did not find her ‘low level activities’ to put her in danger if 
returned and the incident of sexual violence was not established to be connected with her 
actual or imputed political opinion. Since their assessment was that the incident of rape 
was committed by state actors for individual satisfaction, she could be assumed to find 
protection of state authorities and was not subjected to a future risk of being 
persecuted.262 
259Guidelines on Gender-related Persecution, supra note 120, Para.32 
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Similarly, the national gender-guidelines of the UK obliges personnel of the Border 
Agency  
‘not to underestimate or overlook the political dimensions of women's 
experiences of persecution even though a woman may not regard herself as 
making a political statement. Non-conformist opinions or behaviour may in 
certain circumstances be the expression of a political opinion or may result in a 
woman having a political opinion attributed to her whether she holds one or not. 
For instance opposition to institutionalised discrimination against women in 
society or expressing views in opposition to the predominant social or cultural 
norms may be seen to constitute a political opinion. Non-conformist behaviour 
in certain cultures such as refusing to wear a veil, pursuing an education or 
choosing a partner could also lead to a woman having a political opinion 
attributed to her.’263 
Despite those instructions providing guidance, it seems that decision-makers and judicial 
officers still tend to apply the particular social group ground. In theUK case ofFB v The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department264, the claim was decided under the 
particular social group calculus, even though the court gave rise to the question of 
imputed political opinion. The case dealt with a 16 year old citizen from Sierra Leone, 
who fled her home country after she was forced to marry the village chief after her 
mother’s death. She shouldhave become his fourth wife, despite the considerable age 
gap between them. Furthermore, because her mother was a Sowei, that is a woman 
performing female genital mutilations on girls, the applicant, who herself had been 
subjected to this harmful tradition, was expected to undertake her mother’s functions in 
accordance with traditions of her tribe.265 Her first claim was refused as the court found 
that there was no future risk of persecution since she had already undergone the practice 
of female circumcision. It was also found that her fear of being forced to enter into 
marriage with the chief of the village could be avoided through relocation in her country 
of origin.266Only in the appeal, the political extent of her refusal to comply with tradition 
came up. And although it was found that the applicant herself does not see her activities 
as politicallymotivated,others might attribute a political statement toher denial to abide 
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264FB v The Secretary of State for the Home DepartmentFB (Lone women - PSG – internal relocation – 
AA (Uganda) considered) Sierra Leone (2008) UKAIT 00090 
265 Id. Para.1-4 





by social mores and to oppose herself to the rules of the community.267However, in its 
conclusion the Tribunal then granted asylum on the basis of the applicant’s risk of being 
persecuted for reasons of belonging to a particular social group, which was defined as “a 
woman who has shown herself opposed to traditional values in her rural 
environment.”268 
Edwards wonders why it is so difficult for decision-making authorities to recognize the 
political extent of women’s refusal to comply with traditional practices and customs, 
which are often harmful if not life threatening and perpetrated as means to keep them 
subordinate.269 Edwards speaks for a contextual, culture-sensitive interpretation of the 
ground of political opinion when dealing with gender-related asylum claims. Thus, as 
soon as a woman claimant holds beliefs or even acts upon them, resulting in the 
opposition of common views or customs in her society and preserved by any form of 
authority, it should be considered under the political opinion ground. This approach 
would focus on the respective environment of the women’s home country, respecting 
their individual experiences, as even subgroups from society at large, like tribes or clans, 
might have enough power to enforce the maintenance of discriminative or harmful 
practices.270 
In accordance with that, Crawley also challenges the view of cultural relativism, which 
she says is prevalent among decision-making authorities if determining gender-related 
asylum claims. Through upholding the importance of cultural differences, an asylum 
claim of a Sierra Leonean woman, fleeing her fear of forced female genital mutilation, 
was rejected in the first instance in the UK. In the judge’s opinion, FGM was not 
discriminative in her circumstances since the custom is accepted by most of society.271 
Even though this decision was overturned by the House of Lords in an appeal, it shows 
the lack of recognition of women’s experiences, perhaps connected with the fear of 
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European states of being flooded with female refugees, once those harmful customs are 
recognized to amount to persecution.272 
A good example of gendering the political opinion ground among the European member 
states comes from Belgium. There, the Immigration authorities published guidelines on 
women in the asylum procedure which stipulate to consider gender-related claims within 
the assessment of the reasons for persecution primarily under the political opinion 
calculus.273 In line with those instructions, several asylum claims of parents from 
Guinea, fleeing their country due to the risk of their daughters being exposed to female 
genital mutilation, were recognized by courts of second instance for reasons of their 
political opinion. The appeal courts ruled that it is legitimate to fear persecution under 
the ground of political opinion of the 1951 Convention due to the refusal to expose one’s 
daughter to the practice of female circumcision, since the custom was found to be 
compulsory for girls in Guinean society and impossible to avoid and non-compliance 
with the ancient tradition would result in ostracism for the whole family.274 Despite the 
Belgian jurisprudence confirming the UNHCR guidelines on gender-related persecution 
under the ground of political opinion and thus being a standard of good practice for 
European member states in this regard, the working instruction for decision-making 
authorities unfortunately fails to adopt the UNHCR standard on particular social group 
by describing women in general as too diverse to constitute a social group and that the 
applicant’s sex alone is not sufficient to determine her claim under the social group 
calculus.275 
As can be seen from the above disparate decisions, the recast Qualification Directive 
failed to amend its provisions to provide a gendered definition of political opinion and 
thus misses the opportunity to harmonize protection standards among the member states. 
Due to the vague definition found under Article 10 (1) e) countries still apply different 
interpretations to the concept fear for persecution ‘for reasons of political opinion’, 
although some countries adopted more favorable standards in accordance with Recital 
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14 of the recast Directive. It is desirable that European jurisprudence will set clear 
precedent to include women’s experiences under all of the Conventional grounds and 
that some member states follow international or regional practices and adopt compulsory 
guidelines on a national level. 
4.2.3Religion 
Women might be at risk of persecution for reasons of their religion, as a result of 
transgressing social mores, resisting certain traditional customs like dress codes, the 
refusal to observe gender-discriminative practices or laws for married or unmarried 
women alike and holding emancipatory or feminist views. According to the UK gender-
guidelines,”[w]here the religion assigns particular roles or behavioural codes to women, 
a woman who refuses or fails to fulfill her assigned role or abide by the codes may have 
a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of religion.”276 In compliance with the 
recast Qualification Directive and applicable for all five grounds of persecution, it is 
meaningless for the determination process whether the claimant actually possesses the 
religious characteristic causing the fear of persecution or if it is imputed to her by the 
actors of persecution.277 This ground is often closely linked or overlaps with the political 
opinion calculus. The severe punishments by state or non-state agents of religious 
actions or inactions which are in violation of the religious law or customs are often 
prevalent in theocracies where specific behavioral roles are imposed on the female 
population278 and thus a refusal to conform with those roles can be viewed as a threat for 
the political system.279 Claims should be also considered under this ground if the state is 
unable to provide effective protection against the rule of political groups in some parts 
of the applicant’s country of origin, or if the state favors a specific religious 
persuasion.280 
There are two crucial elements when defining religion. The UNHCR Handbook 
combines them and refers to one’s right to freely choose her religion or conscience, 
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which is understood to include any “theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs”281 and to 
change and practice it accordingly.282 Hathaway clarifies that an asylum claim based on 
religion can also be put down to comprise these two dimensions. Firstly, someone might 
be at risk of persecution simply for the reason for her religion, no matter if she is a self-
defined adherent of that particular religion or only assumed to belong thereto by her 
persecutors. Secondly, one might fear persecution due to her manifestation of her 
beliefs.283 
Two cases will be considered under this Convention ground. The first is an example 
from New Zealand, dating as far back as 1994. Although not European, this case is 
reviewed as the Appeal Court appliesa positive gender-sensitive interpretation of the 
religion and political opinion ground, which are overlapping. The second example is a 
current decision from the UK House of Lords, which granted the right to stay on 
humanitarian grounds to the appellant after her claim was rejected in lower instance 
decisions. 
In Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93284the judgesconsidered a claim of an Iranian woman, 
who left her country of origin due to her fear of being persecuted by her own family and 
the Iranian government. She based her claim on four different grounds, comprising her 
own race and religion, the political views and activities of her relatives, the oppressive 
attitude and discrimination of the male family member in her own family as well as the 
systematic oppression in society at large.285 She provided evidence of the arrest and 
imprisonment of some of her close relatives for their political views by the governmental 
regime and furthermore testified credibly of her own family’s mistreatment of female 
members, which was reflected in the domination of Iranian men over women in society 
at large, strongly upholding the traditional concept of honor. The subordination of 
women became clear through her testimony of cases of forced marriage, honor killings, 
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refusal of gaining education and strict dress-codes which were common in her family.286 
The Immigration Service denied her claim as they did not find the discrimination women 
are subjected to and the inferior attitudes and codes they must conform to in Iran to 
cumulatively amounting to persecution. Although they agreed that Arabic women as a 
minority face a suppressive environment, those actions were not considered severe 
enough to amount to a well-founded fear of persecution.287 
However, the Appeal Court found the lower court’s decision to neglect the crucial 
elements of her claim and considered her opposition to the patriarchal system in both, 
the Iranian society and within her family under two grounds of the 1951 Convention, 
namely political opinion and religion. They found her fear of being persecuted by 
members of her extended family and also state-agents was well-founded for reasons of 
her political opinion and religion and refugee status was granted.288 
Contrary to this holistic understanding of that woman’s experiences in Iran, in the case 
of EM (Lebanon) (FC) (Appellant) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department289the appellant was a Lebanese woman, whose claim was rejected on the 
first instance by the immigration authorities in the UK and again in the following appeal 
before the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal.290 Then, the Court of Appeal further 
refused her claim to stay on humanitarian grounds291, before this right was eventually 
granted by the House of Lords.292 
The claimant applied for asylum together with her son, since her husband was violent 
towards her and did not want to have children. Due to his violent attacks, she lost her 
first child during pregnancy.293 After their first child, the said son, was born, his father 
tried to kidnap the newborn baby. After this attempt failed, he got extremely violent 
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towards the claimants. Eventually, the applicant was able to get divorced with help of a 
national court in Lebanon, awarding her with custody over her son until his seventh 
birthday. Then, under Islamic law, the father automatically gets the right of custody over 
the child. Out of her fear to lose her son, she arranged false documents and left the 
country. Because of that she feared persecution from her husband and national 
authorities upon return.294 The appellant based her claim on the ground of belonging to a 
particular social group, namely ‘women in Lebanon’, who, as she states, are deprived of 
their rights.295 The Panel used the claimant’s own history, and the fact that she was able 
to gain help from the national courts regarding her divorce, to deny this assertion. The 
following explanation was given by the court.  
‘Muslims in Lebanon are governed, in family matters, by Muslim law. The fact 
that the rules of Muslim law operate in a way which some Western societies 
might regard as discriminatory does not show that all women are deprived of 
standing before the law.’296 
While they further confirmed that she might be able to obtain visitation rights upon 
return with her son to Lebanon by national courts,297 they also recognized her likelihood 
to be imprisoned.298 It might be questionable what the Immigration Tribunal would have 
found if considering the claim under the ground of religion, since it can be said that she 
did not accept the religious interpretation of the law. This outcome is consistent with the 
finding of the study, assessing gender-related asylum claims in Europe, which found that 
most states fail to apply a gendered interpretation of this Convention ground.299 In the 
latter case, the permission to stay on humanitarian grounds was only granted by the 
House of Lords, after the appellant’s son was heard. Lord Hope of Craighead concluded 
that in his opinion the case has compelling reasons to grant them permission to stay on 
humanitarian grounds, especially under consideration of her son’s needs.300 Thus, the 
decision-makers in this case provided a very restrictive interpretation of the particular 
social group calculus, accompanied by a lack of consideration of the political opinion 
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and religion ground. Furthermore, they also fail to properly examine the risk of 
persecution and do not consider the impact on the claimant caused by the agents of 
persecution.  
The recast Qualification Directive does not provide any guidance regarding a gender-
sensitive interpretation of a gender-related asylum claim for reasons of religion. 
Consequently, it is up to decision-makers and judges how to interpret this ground in such 
claims. While some might have national guidelines which go beyond the recast 
Directive, the current protection framework does not appropriately respond to the 
difficulties women face ingender-related asylum claims regarding the ground of religion.  
4.3Actors of persecution and actors of protection 
For most asylum claims lodged by women, if subjected to gendered forms of harmful 
customs and discriminative practices, the risk of persecution does not emanate from 
state-agents, but rather from private actors like family- or community members. The 
public-private dichotomy arises, creating a barrier for the applicability of state 
obligations for women’s human rights violations, since those forms of harm were long 
considered private or cultural issues.301 The question of the non-state actor 
accountability is closely connected with the question of the availability of a statewhich is 
willing and able to provide protection to the victim. These two elements are crucial for 
the outcome of asylum claims based on gender-related persecution.  
Article 6 of the recast Qualification Directive, dealing with actors of persecution, was 
not amended. Consistent to the provisions of the former Qualification Directive, actors 
of persecution may be state actors, “parties or organizations controlling the State or a 
substantial part of the territory”, or private persons.302 If one is persecuted or fears 
persecution by a non-state actor, it must be demonstrated that there is no protection 
available in the country of origin; neither provided by the state or the controlling groups, 
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nor by international organizations.303Thus, Article 6 must be read along with Article 7, 
providing a closer description of who is able to offer protection from persecution and 
what kind of protection must be offered.  
With the assistance of international, regional and national refugee rights organizations, 
commenting on the recast Qualification proposal, Article 7 on actors of protection was 
amended to provide better guidance for the EU member states. Herein it is set out that 
the state, controlling parties or international organizations are able to provide protection 
to individuals.304 There is controversy regarding whether non-state agents should be 
entitled to be able to provide protection. Both, the UNHCR and ECRE suggest that 
“non-state actors in principle should not be considered actors of protection”305, since 
they do not have the same attributes as states are thus lack enforcement mechanism.306 
However, since the former Qualification Directive lacked clear obligations as to what 
extent protection must be provided to individuals, some member states tended to 
interpret Article 7 of the former Directive insofar as several organizations of the UN, 
and further that even tribes or communities, can offer protection from severe human 
rights violations.307 To clarify this and offer some better protection standards, 
amendments were made to the recast Directive to include that those actors must be 
willing and able to provide appropriate protection. The recommended addition to this 
provision to include that those actors of protection should be “willing and able to 
enforce the rule of law” was not adopted.308 Subparagraph 2 of Article 7 of the recast 
Directive further prescribes that the protection “must be effective and of a non-
temporary nature.”309 While this provision sounds promising at first, the recast 
Qualification Directive goes on to say that “protection is generally provided when the 
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actors mentioned (…) take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of 
serious harm”310. This weak guidance of ‘reasonable steps’ is arguably insufficient to 
ensure that the individual is – de facto – effectively protected against persecution or 
serious harm for a durable time.311 
In  Salahadin Abdulla & Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland312,the CJEU found  
‘that Article 7(1) of the Directive does not preclude the protection from being 
guaranteed by international organizations, including protection ensured through 
the presence of a multinational force in the territory of the third country.’313 
It went on to consider if protection can be said to be available if only through the help of 
multinational troops.314 Hereby emphasis was given to the accessibility of that protection 
for the individual. The court states that to verify if the individual will have access to 
effective protection,  
‘the competent authorities must assess, in particular, the conditions of operation 
of, on the one hand, the institutions, authorities and security forces and, on the 
other, all groups or bodies of the third country which may, by their action or 
inaction, be responsible for acts of persecution.’315 
According to this, the simple presence of an agent of protection is never sufficient. But,  
‘[t]he existence of an actor of protection and the availability, effectiveness and 
enduring nature of the protection provided by that actor in the refugee’s country 
of nationality are questions of fact which must be assessed by the national court 
in the light of the above considerations.’316 
Thus, while the CJEU defines ‘reasonable steps’ to a better extent than the recast 
Directive which might be used by member states as guidance, it also confirms the 
applicability of non-state agents to be actors of protection. Unfortunately, this approach 
contradicts international standards of refugee protection and even the very definition of a 
refugee in the 1951 Convention, in which the availability of protection is linked to one’s 
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country of nationality.317 National law diverges in this regard, whether non-state actors 
are considered as protectors.318And although there is no legal requirement for asylum 
applicants to exhaust all sources of state protection, nor to seek protection in one’s home 
country before escape, many member states demand a reasonable explanation from the 
claimant why protection was not sought. This often ignores the bias of local authorities 
against women if they seek help from harmful practices.319It is to help that member 
states exercise their right to implement better standards. But since then, a restrictive 
approach might be applied, which especially impacts on asylum claims of women, since 
NGOs have been considered as possible protectors from persecution by non-state actors, 
without bearing in mind their lack of temporary and effective activities. 
If actors of protection are found to be available for an asylum applicant in her country of 
origin, or if she can be considered to live free from persecution in another part of her 
country than her habitual residence, Article 8 of internal protection might be applicable. 
4.4Internal Protection or Relocation Alternative 
The concept of internal protection alternative is not considered under the 1951 
Convention320, but rather is a ‘state-created doctrine’, used to reject refugee statuses321. 
This practice has also been adopted by European member states and is addressed in 
Article 8 of the recast Qualification Directive. Hereunder states are obliged for consider 
that an asylum seeker might not be eligible to international protection, if she “has no 
well-founded fear of being persecuted or is not at real risk of suffering or serious harm: 
or (…) has access to protection against persecution or serious harm as defined in Article 
7” in one part of her country of nationality.322 If it is established in the assessment of an 
asylum claim that one of these two situations is found asylum might be denied on that 
basis.  
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This provision is of importance for claimants being at risk of persecution by non-state 
actors and thus it has specific relevance for refugee women since perpetrators in gender-
based persecution claims are in most cases relatives or community members and not 
state officials. For asylum seekers who are at real risk of persecution by state-actors in 
their home country, the alternative to relocate within that country does not exist. This is 
a result of the presumption that state officials have national reach.323 
While the predecessor of the recast Directive required that “the applicant can reasonably 
be expected to stay in that part of the country”324, the new Article was amended to 
demand the safe and legal journey of the claimant to that area of the country, as well as 
the expectation to reasonably settle there.325 This partly reflects the jurisprudence of 
theECtHR. In Salah Sheekh v Netherlands the court found the appropriate standard for 
internal protection is the requirement for the applicant to “be able to settle there”.326 In 
order to establish whether the applicant has the possibility to settle in another area of her 
country, “the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country and (…) the 
personal circumstances of the applicant” must be taken into account.327 The UNHCR 
guidelines offer better guidance, stating that several factors, ranging from one’s “age, 
sex, health, disability, family situation and relationships, [to] social or other 
vulnerabilities, ethnic, cultural or religious considerations, political and social links and 
compatibility, language abilities, educational, professional and work background and 
opportunities, and any past persecution and its psychological effects”328 as well as socio-
economic circumstances must be considered in the assessment of an internal relocation 
alternative.329 Women are often particularly affected by relocation, even more so if they 
are unaccompanied by male relatives, single or divorced. Those personal circumstances 
can place them in situations of undue hardship.330 Thus, it is highly recommended for 
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member states to observe the UNHCR guidelines to avoid putting women under future 
risk of persecution.  
Regarding women’s claim in the EU, the ECtHR found that the custom of female genital 
mutilation is against one’s right not to be subjected to torture and degrading or inhuman 
treatment as laid down in Article 3 of the ECHR.331 Nonetheless, in several European 
countries women were denied refugee status due to the fact that the courts established 
the possibility of an internal relocation alternative.332 These approaches are not in line 
with UNHCR guidance on the treatment of women at risk of female genital mutilation, 
where it is explicitly stated that the fact of the state’s unwillingness or inability to protect 
its female citizens from persecution in one area of its territory, should automatically lead 
to the assumption that it will then also fail to provide effective protection in another part 
of the country.333 
Although the recast Qualification Directive further states to ensure the use of “precise 
and up-to-date information from relevant sources”334, a study of the UK-based refugee 
organization Asylum Aid found decision-making authorities at the first instance level to 
use country of origin information selectively.335 
Bailliet urges states to implement the due diligence standard regarding the assessment of 
internal flight alternatives in women’s asylum claims on an individual basis.336 The due 
diligence concept is pretty well established within international women’s legislation.337 
In accordance with this precise assessment standard, after several other appeals have 
been refused or denied, the ECtHR decided that an Afghan woman could not be 
deported to her country of origin, since this would violate Article 3 of the ECHR, as a 
                                                 
331Collins and Akaziebie v Sweden, Application No. 23944/05 (2007) 
332Izevbekhai and Others v Ireland,  Application No. 43408/08 (2011) and Omeredov Austria, Application 
No. 8969/10 (2011) 
333UNHCR. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating To Female Genital Mutilation (2009) Para.28 
334 Recast Qualification Directive, supra note 5, Art.8(2) 
335Asylum Aid.Unsustainable: the quality of initial decision-making in women’s asylum claims (2011) at 
65 
336 Cecilia Bailliet ‘Persecution in the Home – Applying the Due Diligence Standard to Harmful 
Traditional Practices within Human Rights ad Refugee Law’ Nordic Journal of Human Rights 30:1 (2012) 
at 53 
337General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 90,Para.9, see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and consequences Yakin Ertürk. The Due Diligence Standard as a 





result of her cumulative risks she might be subjected to upon return.338 This judgment 
approves UNHCR’s explanation of the cumulative effect. It prescribes a concept where 
different factors, separately not leading to the preclusion of an internal relocation 
alternative, together amount to such unduly harsh circumstances for the claimant that she 
cannot be reasonably expected to settle there.339 
Despite existent guidelines and some holistic judgments, the member states’ future 
application of Article 8 under the recast Qualification Directive might fall short for 
women’s claims of asylum, since the consideration of gender-related aspects is not 
required under the assessment of the internal flight alternative.  
4.5Subsidiary protection standards 
In a case where international protection cannot be granted, but threats for the applicant’s 
life or freedom are given due to certain circumstances in her country of nationality, she 
cannot be deported. Thus, subsidiary protection might be granted, which is a temporary 
protection status. Thus, if the situation in the home country of the person changes and 
the risk of serious harm ceased to exist, subsidiary protection can be withdrawn and the 
person is sent back. 
Under Chapter five of the recast Qualification Directive rules are laid down for the 
qualification of persons for subsidiary protection.340 In accordance with the definition of 
a ‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’, temporary protection shall be provided to 
individuals, who do not qualify for refugee status, but where it is established that their 
life is in serious risk of severe harm if they are returned to their country of nationality or 
former habitual residence.341 Following this obligatory provision for the member states, 
to adjudicate temporary protection to those who are entitled to it under the terms of the 
recast Qualification Directive, the standard of international protection was extended at 
least theoretically.342The recast Directive implements criteria for the eligibility of 
persons to subsidiary protection, which are drawn from both, the responsibilities arising 
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from international human rights legislationand the common practices of EU member 
states.343In practice however,asylum seekers face two obstacles: either being granted the 
inferior status of subsidiary protection than refugee status, or not being able to meet the 
requirements for subsidiary status and as a consequence, not being eligible for temporary 
protection either.344This obstacle for claimants to gain subsidiary protection on the one 
hand, together with wide divergences in the interpretation of states on the other hand 
emerges mainly from the third subparagraph of Article 15 of the recast Qualification 
Directive. This Article defines what constitutes ‘serious harm’ for the qualification of 
subsidiary protection under the recast Directive, which consists of: 
(a) ‘the death penalty or execution; or  
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in 
the country of origin; or  
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal conflict.’345 
The latter subparagraph allows decision-makers to apply a narrow interpretation due to 
the required element for a claimant to show an ‘individual threat’. This restrictive 
requirement can be derived from Recital 35 of the recast Directive which clarifies that 
risks, which are present for the whole or parts of the population, do usually not create 
the assumption to constitute a serious harm for an individual.346 To meet the 
requirements of this element might be particularly difficult for women claimants who 
fear severe harm perpetrated by non-state agents.  
Upon request of Belgium, in a judgment by the CJEU a definition was provided for the 
member states to interpret that the entitlement to subsidiary protection “is not subject to 
the condition that that applicant adduce evidence that [she] is specifically targeted”347 
and the link between the extent of indiscriminate violence and the individual threat of 
the person. Thus, the need of an applicant to prove her individual threat shrinks with the 
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increase of the severity of the violence in her country.348 Nonetheless, the application of 
that Article varies among the member states and impacts on the outcomes of women’s 
asylum claims. Generally, it is the creation of a subordinate protection regime, since 
protection obligations arising under Article 15 of the recast Directive are only of 
temporary nature.349 
Two cases in which the denial of refugee status but the grant of subsidiary protection 
might be debatable will be summarized as they show the difficulty to establish that the 
harm feared amounts to persecution and to link it to one of the five Convention grounds.  
The first example is a German case, addressing the risk of female genital mutilation and 
forced marriage of a Nigerian woman. Both harmful customs have not been recognized 
to amount to persecution under the grounds of political opinion and/or particular social 
group. However, the court found that she in all probability would be exposed to serious 
harm in form of inhuman or degrading treatment upon her return, considering her 
individual situation as a single woman with broken family ties in a traditional society. 
This was likely to lead to the socio-economic marginalization of her and thus the court 
found she qualified for subsidiary protection.350 In a French case, a Nigerian woman 
who got victimized as a prostitute by human traffickers was found not to be at risk of 
persecution due to her membership of a particular social group, but that she will 
probably be exposed to serious harm by her traffickers if returned to her country of 
origin.351 The latter judgment was contrary to a previous decision of the same court, 
where in a very similar case, refugee status was granted on the basis of her well-founded 
fear as a member of a particular social group.352 These cases demonstrate the attempt of 
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decision-makers to deny asylum while implementing “a remedy of for the plight of a 
persecuted woman” in terms of providing subsidiary protection, which comes along with 
less rights in the host state, although the status might be extended several times, due to 
the non-cessation of the circumstances in the country of origin of the individual.353 
Unlike times of conflict, which are likely to cease within some months or years, a shift 
of social and cultural attitudes, underlying gender-related asylum claims, takes longer 
and puts women in a dilemma between the impossibility to return home on the one hand 
and the impossibility to fully settle in the host country through the temporary nature of 
the permit and the limits of rights.354 
In an Irish case, the High Court challenged a previous outcome, which denied subsidiary 
protection to a Nigerian woman355, because they found that her fear of serious harm did 
not emerge from ‘actors of serious harm’ but instead from non-state agents356, namely 
her husband. The judges referred to national regulations where “compelling reasons 
arising out of previous persecution or serious harm alone may nevertheless warrant a 
determination that the applicant is eligible for protection.”357 Thus, the previous decision 
was quashed and judicial review granted.358 
As can be seen from the cases outlined, the concept for subsidiary protection might be 
misinterpreted due to vague formulations of the law itself and it might be flawed through 
the application of a framework reflecting men’s experiences of political persecution. But 
if the state is not able or willing to offer protection against forms of gender-based 
violence and individuals can act with impunity, then the threat emanating from non-state 
actors must be recognized in the asylum determination procedure to be sufficient for 
international protection.  
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5. Conclusion
This paper provided on overview of the difficulties women fleeing harmful traditional 
practices face during the asylum determination process. The recast Qualification 
Directive, the regional instrument providing the legal framework for refugee protection, 
was analyzed to what extent it provides protection to women seeking asylum on the 
basis of gender-related claims. Due to the lack of protection provisions regarding one’s 
gender under the 1951 Convention, and the slow progress made on international level to 
include gender-related asylum claims under the refugee definition, regional legislation 
was adopted to address this problem in more detail. The 2004 Qualification Directive 
ought to harmonize the different standards in the member states, since they resulted in 
immensely varying outcomes of asylum claims of same third country nationals. As a 
result of the interpretive guidance of courts and the gender-guidelines provided by 
UNHCR, the recast Directive offers clearer provisions compared to the former 
Qualification Directive and goes beyond the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention. 
But despite the fact that it obliges member states to consider gender-specific forms of 
harm and gender aspects in the asylum determination process, it still provides gaps and 
shortcomings as this paper has shown. They will be summarized again below. 
As discussed in this paper, several Articles of the recast Qualification Directive were 
amended to make the interpretation of the refugee status determination more gender-
sensitive and to address those obstacles that women face in their asylum determination 
processes. Due to the obligation on the member states to amend their national legislation 
accordingly by the 21December of last year, one must wait and see ifdecision-makers, 
particularly at the first instance level, are able to apply the recast Directive in light of the 
purpose of the 1951 Convention, in a more gender-sensitive manner. 
The examination of those articles of the recast Directive, which are of importance for 
female claimants who seek asylum from gender-based forms of harm, revealed that a 
lack of appropriate guidance regarding protection standards for women still exists. 
Despite that, two main amendments have been made. Addressing the core of the legal 





is of particular relevance for female asylum seekers. Firstly, the recast Directive clearly 
states in Article 9 that either the act of persecution or the withholding of state protection 
can be linked to one of the grounds of the 1951 Convention. This addition has the 
potential to positively impact on asylum claims of women, who are at risk of persecution 
originating from non-state agents. Secondly, the obligation for member states to take 
‘gender-related aspects’ into account when examining asylum claims under the 
enumerated ground of particular social group is laudable. In future questions of one’s 
gender identity and sexual orientation must find consideration under this ground.  
However, although it is positive to explicitly include non-state agents as possible actors 
of persecution, a claim arising thereunder is only applicable if there’s no state protection 
available, which in turn can be provided by non-governmental international 
organizations. It is questionable whether international organizations are able to 
effectively protect a claimant perpetually. Furthermore is the concept of actors of 
protection, which is directly related to the non-state agent question, too vague in its 
guidance. It fails to provide an appropriate interpretation for the term of ’reasonable 
steps’ which actors of protection are supposed to take for the prevention of the risk of 
persecution in the claimant’s country of nationality. Consequently, it can be assumed 
that member states will interpret the term differently and as a result reach different 
outcomes of who can effectively offer protection. Thus, protection standards will further 
vary depending on where the asylum application is lodged. 
In addition, the concept of internal flight alternative might create a future system to 
avoid responsibility of refugee protection. It is most relevant for women because Article 
8 is only applicable if the fear of persecution emanates from private persons. While 
Article 8 was subject to improvements compared to its predecessor, no attention is paid 
to the vulnerable situation some women might face upon relocation. This is also contrary 
to UNHCR practice where women who are victims of gender-based violence, are 
considered as vulnerable group and have special needs. But under the recast Directive 
women do not constitute a vulnerable group and consequently no specific measures are 
taken into account regarding the internal flight alternative for women. Furthermore, 
Article 8 doesnot explainsufficient detail what is meant with the expectation of the 
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claimant to reasonably settle there. No reference whatsoever is made to consider 
women’s situation, for example with regard to socio, economic or cultural difficulties 
they might face if expected to settle in another part of their country. Again, since there is 
too much room for interpretation, member states will struggle to apply this provision 
uniformly and consistently. While some authorities or courts might follow UNHCR 
guidelines or even apply national gender-guidelines, others might interpret it narrowly, 
therewith possibly weakening the harmonization process and gender-sensitive 
interpretation of asylum claims. 
Contrary to the UNHCR guidelines on gender-based persecution, the recast 
Qualification Directive fails to provide a gendered interpretation of all Convention 
grounds. Despite the improvement to include ‘gender-related aspects’ under the 
particular social group calculus in asylum determination processes, states may struggle 
to apply a uniform interpretation of this term. It might even be necessary to ask 
European courts for interpretive guidance. Furthermore, the definition of a particular 
social group as set out in the recast Directive falls short due to the cumulative 
requirement of both approaches, the one of immutability and the one of social 
perception. Thus, it is more restrictive than the requirements in international guidelines. 
This can create a hurdle for women if they are for example not perceived as a particular 
social group by society.  
It remains to be seen whether decision-makers will be able to apply the provisions of the 
recast Qualification Directive from a gender-sensitive perspective and if they will refer 
to and follow the more holistic guidelines of UNHCR in this regard. If they will fail to 
recognize women’s experiences of traditional harmful customs and practices as 
amounting to persecution on account of the Convention grounds, it is likely that a 
subsidiary protection system may result. This in turn could impose another obstacle on 
female claimants due to its temporary protection nature. However, it is worth 
mentioning here that the content of subsidiary protection was crucially enhanced since 
persons with that status now enjoy the same rights as recognized refugees under the 





The Common European Asylum System shall be finally and fully implemented by the 
middle of 2015. As a result of theremainingchallenges for the member states, it is 
unlikely that the recast Qualification Directive will be implemented in the light of the 
1951 Convention and offers sufficient protection standards for refugee women fleeing 
gender-based violence. Decision-makers at the first instance level may still apply a 
stringent interpretation of a refugeethrough a male-focused lens. The cases of women’s 
claims as discussed above were mostly decided in appeal decisions. However, this is 
time- and cost-consuming and contrary to the goal of the Common European Asylum 
System to make the determination processes and outcomes fairer and faster. It also 
proves difficult for some women who do not have the financial means or appropriate 
knowledge of their rights to appeal against a first instance refusal.  
Lastly, the recast Qualification Directive must be seen in connection with the other 
instruments adopted under the Common European Asylum System. For example: the 
fact that the recast Asylum Procedures Directive allows member states to define 
independently, which countries they consider as so-called‘safe third countries’ and ‘safe 
countries of origin’ undermines the application of equal protection standards under the 
recast Qualification Directive. And as long as the Dublin regulation exists, member 
states are able to hand overexamination responsibilities to the countries at the edge of 
Europe. This scenario results in huge differences in asylum numbers and, without help 
or changes, it is not expected that these countries will be able to cope with situations of 
overstrained national asylum systems. Consequently, it is unlikely that the ‘better 
standards’ as set out in the recast Qualification Directive will be met accordingly.  
 
 
